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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation is comprised of three studies investigating the effects of informal 
management control systems (MCS) and different types of incentive compensation schemes on 
employees’ performance. Prior research describes informal MCS as implicit sets of structures that 
management adopts to encourage employees to act in a way that aligns with overall organizational 
goals (Berry et al. 2009). Management usually puts informal MCS in place to inspire self-
regulation behaviors among employees; hence, management may not reward or penalize employee 
behavior that is consistent or inconsistent with this informal MCS (Berry et al. 2009; Christ et al. 
2008). Informal controls are implied by social pressures, such as employees’ feedback, and 
management communication, such as a value statement or the organizational culture, where no 
explicit enforcement measures exist (Berry et al. 2009; Kachelmeier, Thornock and Williamson 
2015). The first study examines whether the presence of a value statement (an informal MCS) can 
be used to motivate employees to perform important, but uncompensated subsequent tasks. The 
second study extends the first study by examining whether the interactive method of delivery of a 
value statement (informal MCS) can be used in conjunction with an incentive scheme to improve 
employees’ performance. Lastly, the third study investigates the impact of an important aspect of 
organizational context, specifically organizational culture (informal MCS), and different types of 
incentive compensation schemes on strategy surrogation.  
The first study investigates whether the presence of a value statement (an informal MCS) 
can be used to motivate employees to perform important, but uncompensated tasks. Additionally, 
this study seeks to examine the type of incentive scheme that will result in the highest subsequent 
uncompensated task performance in the presence of an organizational value statement. 
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Considering that incentive contracts cannot completely govern all the employees’ responsibilities 
(Christ, Emett, Summers and Wood 2012), this study investigates how employees will perform 
their important but uncompensated tasks. The study shows that under fixed pay compensation, the 
presence of a value statement improves the performance of employees compared to the absence of 
a value statement. Conversely, under a piece rate incentive compensation, the presence of a value 
statement negatively influences the performance of employees in the important but uncompensated 
task. The study also shows that the intrinsic motivation of employees operating under piece rate 
compensation is more likely to be crowded out by their incentive pay relative to employees 
operating under a fixed wage.  
The second study examines whether the interactive method of delivery of a value statement 
(informal MCS) through electronic integration can be used in conjunction with an incentive 
scheme to improve employees’ performance. Prior research shows that effectiveness of incentive 
systems is influenced by the presence or absence of a nonbinding value statement in the 
organization. A value statement is a declaration that communicates an organization’s priorities and 
core beliefs to its customers and employees. Drawing upon the mere-exposure effect, the results 
of the study show that the employees who experience the interactive delivery of a value statement 
do not perform significantly better than employees who experience the passive delivery of a value 
statement. However, employees who receive a piece-rate incentive perform significantly better 
than employees who receive a fixed pay incentive. As predicted, the method of delivery of an 
organizational value statement moderates the effectiveness of a fixed pay incentive scheme. 
The third study draws upon the theory of inattentional blindness to investigate whether 
different types of organizational culture, control dominant or flexibility dominant, impacts strategy 
surrogation. Strategy surrogation occurs when managers focus on the measures in the SPMS on 
v 
which they are compensated and completely or partially lose focus on the overall strategic 
objectives of the organization (Choi et al. 2012, 2013). Organizational culture is defined as a set 
of dominant values, beliefs, and assumptions that governs how people behave in organizations 
(Henri 2006). The results of the study show that there is no significant difference between 
employees operating under a control-dominant culture and employees operating under a 
flexibility-dominant culture. Similarly, the type of organizational culture does not moderate the 
relationship between incentive systems and strategy surrogation. However, employees operating 
under a pay-for-performance compensation scheme significantly surrogate more than employees 
operating under a fixed pay compensation scheme. 
Collectively these studies contribute to management accounting research by examining 
how different types of informal MCS such as organizational value statement and organizational 
culture interact with incentive compensation scheme. Specifically, these three studies highlight 
how and when we can use informal MCS to improve employees’ performance as well as their 
decision making in the organization. Study one contributes to research and practice by highlighting 
situations where a pay-for-performance incentive scheme may result in unintended consequences. 
Study two contributes to the management control literature by demonstrating how utilizing 
technology can enhance the delivery of an organization’s value statement and ultimately improve 
employees’ performance. Study three contributes to the incentives and organizational culture 
literature as well as strategy surrogation research by examining institutional factors that may 
inhibit or exacerbate surrogation. 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation is comprised of three studies investigating the effects of informal 
management control systems (MCS) and different types of incentive compensation schemes on 
employees’ performance. Prior research describes informal MCS as implicit sets of structures that 
management adopts to encourage employees to act in a way that aligns with overall organizational 
goals (Berry et al. 2009). Management usually puts informal MCS in place to inspire self-
regulation behaviors among employees; hence, management may not reward or penalize employee 
behavior that is consistent or inconsistent with this informal MCS (Berry et al. 2009; Christ et al. 
2008).  
Informal management controls are important to organizations because they are expected to 
encourage innovation (Bisbe and Otley 2004). Informal controls are also known as organic 
communication because they inspire a free flow of information throughout the organization, and 
promote a flexible organizational culture that stimulates an adaptive decision making work 
environment (Chenhall and Morris 1995). Informal controls are implied by social pressures, such 
as feedback, and management communication, such as a value statement or the organizational 
culture, where no explicit enforcement measures exist (Berry et al. 2009; Kachelmeier, Thornock 
and Williamson 2015). Considering the importance of informal management controls highlighted 
above, studies examining the effects of informal MCS and different types of incentive 
compensation schemes contribute to our understanding of how and when to implement informal 
MCS in order to improve employees’ performance. Examples of informal MCS that have been 
examined in prior accounting studies are vicarious learning (Choi et al. 2016), employees’ 
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feedback (Christ et al. 2016), organizational culture (Chow et al. 2002; Dent 1991; Henri 2006; 
Pratt and Beaulieu 1992) and organizational value statements (Kachelmeier et al. 2015).  
 This research comprises of three separate experimental studies, all centered on the 
interaction between informal MCS and incentive compensation schemes on employees’ 
performance. The first study examines whether the presence of a value statement (an informal 
MCS) can be used to motivate employees to perform important but uncompensated subsequent 
tasks. Additionally, this study examines the type of incentive scheme that will result in the highest 
subsequent uncompensated task performance in the presence of an organizational value statement. 
The second study extends the first study by examining whether the interactive method of delivery 
of a value statement (informal MCS) can be used in conjunction with an incentive scheme to 
improve employees’ performance. Lastly, the third study investigates the impact of an important 
aspect of organizational context, specifically organizational culture (informal MCS), and different 
types of incentive compensation schemes on strategy surrogation. Strategy surrogation occurs 
when managers focus on the measures of the strategic performance measurement systems (SPMS) 
on which they are compensated and completely or partially lose focus on the overall strategic 
objectives of the organization (Choi, Hecht, & Tayler, 2012, 2013). The following subsections 
describe the manner in which each study approaches the investigation of the effect of informal 
MCS and the incentive compensation schemes on employees’ performance. The final subsection 
contains the overall contribution of this dissertation.  
Study One: The Effects of Organizational Value Statement and Economic Incentives on 
Employees’ Performance 
The first study examines whether the presence of a value statement (an informal MCS) can 
be used to motivate employees to perform important, but uncompensated tasks. Additionally, this 
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study examines the type of incentive scheme that results in the highest subsequent uncompensated 
task performance in the presence of an organizational value statement. Using an economic 
incentive contract to explicitly stimulate expected  behavior from employees is  desirable but often 
difficult to achieve (Choi, Hecht, Tafkov and Towry 2016). Considering that incentive contracts 
cannot completely govern all the employees’ responsibilities (Christ, Emett, Summers and Wood 
2012), this study investigates how employees perform important but uncompensated tasks, and the 
decisions employees make when economic incentives are no longer available. Specifically, it 
examines whether the presence of an organizational value statement can be used to drive 
employees’ uncompensated subsequent task performance. The effect of extrinsic rewards, such as 
incentive compensation, on intrinsic motivation, especially with respect to employees’ subsequent 
attitude toward, or their willingness to engage in, the assigned task in the absence of contingency-
based extrinsic reward is unknown (Lepper and Greene 1978). 
Drawing upon goal regulation theory, this study proposes that the presence of an 
organizational value statement will motivate employees to better perform important but 
uncompensated tasks. Goal regulation refers to a motivational mindset reflecting the reasons for, 
and purpose of, a course of action (Meyer, Becker and Vandenberghe 2004). Goal regulation 
theory proposes that employees who view their behavior as more internally driven by values 
perceive themselves as working toward the accomplishment of ideals, while individuals who view 
their behavior as more externally driven perceive themselves as working toward the fulfilment of 
obligations  (Meyer et al. 2004). Additionally, drawing upon motivation crowding theory, this 
study hypothesizes that in the presence of a value statement, employees who are compensated 
under a fixed pay incentive scheme will be more productive than employees who are compensated 
under a piece-rate incentive scheme when completing important but uncompensated subsequent 
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task. It further hypothesizes that employees operating under a quota incentive scheme are likely to 
be more productive when performing uncompensated tasks than employees operating under a 
piece-rate incentive scheme. Furthermore, because I do not have a strong theoretical basis for 
developing a hypothesis on the motivational differences between quota and fixed pay incentives 
on uncompensated tasks yet these types of contracts are used regularly in practice, I pose a research 
question examining the effect of quota incentive and fixed pay on an uncompensated task 
performance in the presence of an organizational value statement. 
To examine these hypotheses, an experiment is conducted which involves a hypothetical 
case where participants assume the role of an employee in an organization. Business student 
participants are recruited to participate in a 2 x 3 (value statement x incentive system) between-
subjects factorial design. The value statement is manipulated as either present or absent, while 
incentive scheme is manipulated as fixed pay, quota, or piece-rate compensation. The result shows 
that under fixed pay compensation, the presence of a value statement improves the performance 
of employees compared to the absence of a value statement. Conversely, under a piece-rate 
incentive compensation, the presence of a value statement negatively influences the performance 
of the employees in important but uncompensated task. This result indicates that the intrinsic 
motivation of employees operating under piece-rate compensation is more likely to be crowded 
out by their incentive pay relative to employees operating under a fixed pay.  As predicted, in the 
presence of an organizational value statement, participants operating under fixed pay 
compensation perform significantly better than participants operating under piece-rate 
compensation. The result supports the proposition that employees’ intrinsic motivation under 
piece-rate compensation is more likely to be crowded out by the incentive scheme. Similarly, 
participants under fixed pay compensation are more productive in the uncompensated task than 
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under quota compensation. There is no significant difference between uncompensated subsequent 
task performance of employees operating under piece-rate and quota compensation. 
Study Two: The Impact of Incentive Systems and Organizational Value Statement Delivery on 
Employees’ Performance 
The second study examines whether the interactive method of delivery of a value statement 
(informal MCS) through electronic integration can be used in conjunction with an incentive 
scheme to improve employee’s performance. Prior research shows that effectiveness of incentive 
systems is influenced by the presence or absence of a nonbinding value statement in the 
organization. A value statement is a declaration that communicates an organization’s priorities and 
core beliefs to its customers and employees. Drawing upon the mere-exposure effect, I hypothesize 
that the interactive delivery of a value statement will motivate employees to be more productive 
than the passive delivery of a value statement. I also hypothesize that employees operating under 
a piece-rate incentive scheme will be more productive than employees operating under a fixed pay 
incentive scheme. Further, I propose that the method of delivery of an organization value statement 
will moderate the effectiveness of the compensation scheme such that employees operating under 
fixed pay with interactive delivery will perform more like employees operating under piece-rate 
compensation. However, employees operating under fixed pay with passive delivery will be less 
productive than any of the other three conditions. 
To examine these hypotheses, I conduct an experiment which involves a 2 (method of 
delivery: interactive vs passive) x 2 (incentive structure: fixed pay vs piece-rate) between subject 
design. I recruit seventy-seven undergraduate business students at a large university to participate 
in this study. The participants are assigned to four conditions, and they are required to perform a 
decoding task. All participants are given eight rounds of the decoding task and have 60 seconds 
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per round to complete as many decoding exercises as possible. The results of the study show that 
the employees who experience the interactive delivery of a value statement are not significantly 
more productive than employees who experience the passive delivery of a value statement. 
However, employees who receive a piece-rate incentive are significantly more productive than 
employees who receive a fixed pay incentive. As predicted, the method of delivery of an 
organizational value statement moderates the effectiveness of a fixed pay incentive scheme such 
that employees who receive fixed pay with passive delivery are significantly less productive than 
other employees. 
Study Three: The Effects of the Incentive Systems and Organizational Culture on Strategy 
Surrogation 
The third study draws upon the theory of inattentional blindness (Simons 2000) to 
investigate whether different types of organizational culture, control dominant or flexibility 
dominant, impacts strategy surrogation. Strategy surrogation occurs when managers focus on the 
measures in the SPMS on which they are compensated and completely or partially lose focus on 
the overall strategic objectives of the organization (Choi et al., 2012, 2013). Organizational culture 
is defined as a set of dominant values, beliefs, and assumptions that governs how people behave 
in organizations (Henri 2006). According to the competing values model, organizational culture 
can be characterized as control-dominant, values stability and accountability, or flexibility-
dominant, values invention and innovation (Quinn and McGrath, 1985; Quinn, 1988; Quinn and 
Rohrbaugh, 1983). In this third study, I examine the impact of each of these cultural 
characterizations on strategy surrogation. 
I base my predictions about the effect of type of compensation scheme and the moderating 
effect of organizational culture on strategy surrogation on inattentional blindness theory (Simons 
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2000). According to this theory, when individuals concentrate on a particular object or event, they 
often fail to notice other relevant and distinctive objects of interest that are located outside their 
field of focus.  I hypothesize that a control-dominant culture that values stability and accountability 
will result in more strategy surrogation than a flexibility-dominant culture that values invention 
and innovation, and that piece-rate compensation will result in more strategy surrogation than fixed 
pay. Furthermore, I examine whether the type of organizational culture moderates the relationship 
between incentive systems and strategy surrogation. 
This third study involves a 2 (culture: control-dominant vs flexibility-dominant) x 2 
(compensation scheme: fixed wage vs. pay-for-performance) between-subjects design. To 
examine these hypotheses, I conduct an online experiment using 80 Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk) workers as proxies for managers. The results of the study indicate that that there is no 
significant difference between employees operating under a control-dominant culture and 
employees operating under a flexibility-dominant culture. Similarly, organizational culture does 
not moderate the relationship between incentive systems and strategy surrogation. However, 
employees operating under a pay-for-performance compensation scheme significantly surrogate 
more than employees operating under a fixed pay compensation scheme. 
Overall Contribution 
 Collectively these studies contribute to management accounting research by examining 
how different types of informal MCS such as organizational value statement and organizational 
culture interact with incentive compensation scheme. Specifically, these three studies highlight 
how and when we can use informal MCS to improve employees’ performance as well as their 
decision making in the organization. Study one contributes to research and practice by highlighting 
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situations where a pay-for-performance incentive scheme may result in unintended consequences 
(Lepper and Greene 1978). Study two contributes to the management control literature by 
demonstrating how utilizing technology can enhance the delivery of an organization’s value 
statement and ultimately improve employees’ performance. Study three contributes to the 
incentives and organizational culture literature as well as strategy surrogation research by 
examining institutional factors that may inhibit or exacerbate surrogation.  
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STUDY ONE: THE EFFECTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL VALUE 
STATEMENT AND ECONOMIC INCENTIVES ON EMPLOYEES’ 
PERFORMANCE 
Introduction 
Management control systems (MCS) are the set of processes that management implements 
to achieve their organization’s overall goals (Otley 1994). MCS can be divided into formal and 
informal systems based on their purpose, design, and implementation (Bisbe and Otley 2004). For 
example, formal MCS usually consist of purposefully-designed, information-based, and explicit 
sets of structures, routines, and processes that employees must strictly follow in order to ensure 
organizational goals are achieved (Bisbe and Otley 2004). Alternatively, informal MCS have been 
described as implicit sets of structures that management adopts to encourage employees to act in 
a way that is aligned with overall organizational goals. Management does not necessarily penalize 
or reward employees whose behavior is inconsistent or consistent with informal MCS because 
these are mechanisms put in place to encourage, not mandate, self-regulation (Berry, Coad Harris, 
Otley and Stringer 2009).  One such example of an informal MCS is an organizational value 
statement (Kachelmeier, Thornock and Williamson 2015). An organizational value statement 
defines the behaviors, attitudes, and character that management is trying to promote among internal 
stakeholders, such as an organization’s employees (Highhouse, Hoffman Greve and Collins 2002; 
Urbany 2005; Wenstøp and Myrmel 2006). 
Organizations can use informal MCS such as employee feedback (Christ, Emett, Tayler, 
and Wood 2016), organizational culture (Henri 2006), and value statements (Kachelmeier et al. 
2015) to increase employees’ performance. For example, prior research has examined the presence 
of incentive pay (a formal control) and employee feedback (an informal control) on employees’ 
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performance (Christ et al. 2016). Specifically, Christ et al. (2016) highlight the benefits of 
complementing incentive pay with employee feedback in motivating multidimensional task 
performance. Furthermore, Kachelmeier et al. (2015) show that an informal MCS, such as an 
organizational value statement, in conjunction with incentive compensation, can be used to 
improve the quality of employees’ performance. While Kachelmeier et al. (2015) and Christ et al. 
(2016) have examined the influence of informal MCS and incentive compensation on employees’ 
performance when completing compensated tasks, it is unclear how an informal MCS and 
incentive compensation can be used to motivate employees to perform important but 
uncompensated tasks.  
The purpose of this study is to examine whether the presence of a value statement (an 
informal MCS) can be used to motivate employees to perform important but uncompensated 
subsequent tasks. Additionally, this study seeks to examine the type of incentive scheme that will 
result in the highest subsequent uncompensated task performance in the presence of an 
organizational value statement. Using an economic incentive contract to explicitly stimulate 
expected behavior from employees is  desirable but often difficult to achieve (Choi, Hecht, Tafkov 
and Towry 2016). Considering that incentive contracts cannot completely govern all the 
employees’ responsibilities (Christ, Emett, Summers and Wood 2012), this study investigates how 
employees will perform their important but uncompensated tasks, and the decisions employees 
will make when economic incentives are no longer available. Specifically, it looks at whether the 
presence of an organizational value statement can be used to drive employees’ uncompensated 
task performance. The effect of extrinsic rewards, such as incentive systems, on intrinsic 
motivation, especially with respect to employees’ subsequent attitude toward, or their willingness 
to engage in, the assigned task in the absence of contingency-based extrinsic reward is unknown 
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(Lepper and Greene 1978). Intrinsic motivation refers to doing something because it is inherently 
interesting or enjoyable, while extrinsic motivation refers to doing something because it leads to a 
separable outcome (Ryan and Deci 2000).  
Goal regulation refers to a motivational mindset reflecting the reasons for, and purpose of, 
a course of action (Meyer, Becker and Vandenberghe 2004). Goal regulation theory proposes that 
employees who view their behavior as more internally driven by values perceive themselves as 
working toward the accomplishment of ideals, while individuals who view their behavior as more 
externally driven perceive themselves as working toward the fulfilment of obligations  (Meyer et 
al. 2004). Drawing upon goal regulation theory, this study proposes that the presence of an 
organizational value statement will motivate employees to better perform important but 
uncompensated tasks. 
Motivation crowding theory states that external intervention via monetary incentives may 
undermine (or crowd out) intrinsic motivation (Frey and Jegen 2001).  Employees operating under 
a piece-rate incentive scheme are less likely to develop intrinsic motivation towards important but 
uncompensated subsequent tasks due to a crowding out effect of a piece-rate incentive scheme 
(Frey and Jegen 2001) compared to employees compensated using fixed pay or quota incentive 
schemes. Fixed pay schemes do not link pay to performance, piece-rate schemes pay a predefined 
amount of money for each unit, while quota schemes pay a fixed rate irrespective of performance 
at a certain targeted level and performance bonus thereafter (Bonner, Hastie, Sprinkle and Young 
2000). I predict that in the presence of a value statement, employees who are compensated using 
a piece-rate incentive scheme will be less productive1 in important but uncompensated subsequent 
                                                 
1 Productivity is defined as the quantity of output in this study. Less productive implies less output while more 
productive implies more output. 
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tasks than employees who are compensated using fixed pay or quota incentive schemes. 
Furthermore, because I do not have a strong theoretical basis for developing a hypothesis on the 
motivational differences between quota and fixed pay incentives on uncompensated tasks yet these 
types of contracts are used regularly in practice, I pose a research question examining the effect of 
quota incentive and fixed pay on uncompensated task performance in the presence of an 
organizational value statement.  
To examine these hypotheses, an experiment is conducted which involves a hypothetical 
case where participants assume the role of an employee in an organization. Business student 
participants are recruited to participate in a 2 x 3 (value statement x incentive system) between-
subjects factorial design. The value statement is manipulated as either present or absent, while 
incentive scheme is manipulated as fixed pay, quota, or piece-rate compensation. To investigate 
the influence of a value statement and type of incentive schemes on subsequent employees’ 
uncompensated task performance, an experiment is conducted in which participants complete a 
simplified slider task and an uncompensated computerized decoding task. I use a simplified slider 
task in this study because it is a form of simple computerized real effort task that overcomes many 
drawbacks of existing real effort tasks such as counting characters, solving anagrams, negotiating 
mazes and solving mathematical problems (Gill and Prowse 2011).  In this experiment, I capture 
performance in the presence of economic incentives (simplified slider task) and when economic 
incentives are no longer available (uncompensated subsequent computerized decoding task). The 
main dependent variable is participants’ performance on the uncompensated task where the CEO 
requests their help with the computerized decoding task and they are specifically informed that 
they will not be paid for completing the task. Participants are also asked at the end of the 
experiment to provide an explanation of their thought process while completing their tasks. The 
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purpose of the post experimental questions is to gain a better understanding of their decision-
making process.  
I do not find support for the hypothesis that employees will be more productive on 
uncompensated subsequent tasks in the presence of an organizational value statement as compared 
to the absence of an organizational value statement. However, further analysis of the impact of the 
different types of compensation on performance presents interesting results. Under fixed pay 
compensation, participants in the presence of an organizational value statement perform their 
important but uncompensated task better than in the absence of an organizational value statement. 
This result indicates that the introduction of an organizational value statement encourages 
participants to perform their uncompensated task better. Conversely, under piece-rate 
compensation, participants in the presence of an organizational value statement are less productive 
than in the absence of an organizational value statement. The result of the piece-rate compensation 
performance of the uncompensated task is similar to the findings of Kachelmeier et al. (2015), 
which shows that the introduction of a value statement suppresses the benefits of piece-rate 
compensation. The implication of this finding is that organizations should be aware that mere 
introduction of words to motivate employees can either increase or decrease performance 
depending on the type of their incentive compensation and nature of their task. Last, under quota 
compensation, I do not find any significant difference in uncompensated task performance 
depending on the presence and absence of the value statement. 
As predicted, in the presence of an organizational value statement, participants operating 
under fixed pay compensation perform significantly better than participants operating under piece-
rate compensation. The result supports the proposition that employees’ intrinsic motivation under 
piece-rate compensation is more likely to be crowded out by the incentive scheme. Similarly, 
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participants under fixed pay compensation are more productive in the uncompensated task than 
under quota compensation. There is no significant difference between uncompensated subsequent 
task performance of employees operating under piece-rate and quota compensation.  
This study contributes to research and practice in the following ways. First, despite the 
benefits of piece-rate compensation noted in prior literature (Bonner et al. 2002; Cianci et al. 2013; 
Libby and Lipe 1992), this study highlights a situation where a piece-rate compensation may result 
in unintended consequences (Lepper and Greene 1978). Specifically, it demonstrates a situation 
where alternative compensation (fixed pay or quota) result in better performance. The presence of 
an organizational value statement improves performance on uncompensated tasks when employees 
are compensated using fixed pay or quota compensation. The contribution is particularly relevant 
to organizations that pay fixed salaries, as it shows that management could implement an 
organizational value statement to intrinsically motivate employees and improve productivity; 
providing additional economic incentives is not the only way to improve employees’ performance.  
Second, this study extends prior research on how value statements can improve employees’ 
productivity. Despite the findings from Kachelmeier et al. (2015) that a value statement will lower 
overall productivity, this study highlights how an organizational value statement can increase 
overall productivity in certain circumstances. This study hypothesizes that depending on the type 
of incentive scheme, introduction of an informal management control in the form of a value 
statement can be used to intrinsically motivate employees. Implementing a properly aligned value 
statement that will address employees’ uncompensated responsibilities can be used to increase 
employees’ productivity and improve the organization’s image both internally and externally. The 
value statement can complement the role of economic incentives when those incentives do not 
directly apply to employees’ important and new responsibilities. The presence of a value statement 
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will consciously or subconsciously encourage employees to internalize the organization’s values, 
which will cause them to be better organizational citizens by taking on tasks that help the 
organization but for which they are not directly compensated.  
Third, this study utilizes goal regulatory and motivation crowding theories to examine the 
interaction between formal and informal MCS on employees’ performance and judgment and 
decision-making. The study highlights the overjustification effect of a piece-rate incentive scheme 
on employees’ performance (Lepper and Greene 1978). This study contributes to the crowding out 
theory literature by reinforcing how employees’ intrinsic motivation can be overshadowed by the 
incentive scheme, such that their performance on tasks for which they are not directly compensated 
will suffer, even when there is an organizational value statement that encourages strong 
performance on all tasks.  
Last, this study goes beyond Kachelmeier et al. (2015) by examining three different types 
of incentive schemes that can interact with informal MCS to influence employees’ performance. 
There are few studies that examine quota incentive schemes in accounting, as most of the prior 
studies on incentive schemes have focused on fixed pay and piece-rate incentive schemes (Choi et 
al. 2012, 2013; Kachelmeier et al. 2008; Kachelmeier et al. 2015; Libby and Thorne 2009). This 
study contributes to incentive literature by shedding light on the potential benefits of quota 
incentive schemes over piece-rate schemes.   
The paper proceeds as follows: The next section discusses the background literature and 
hypotheses development. Section III discusses the experimental method and design. Last, section 
IV provides the results, and section V discusses the conclusion and opportunity for future 
research. 
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Background and Hypotheses Development 
Formal and Informal MCS and Employee’s Behavior 
Chenhall et al. (2010) suggest that formal and informal controls provide a basis to elaborate 
on the classification schemes of MCS. Their study further suggests that examining the interaction 
between formal and informal MCS is important in understanding how MCS can be designed and 
implemented and their effects on organizational outcomes (Ahrens and Chapman 2004; Auzair 
and Langfield-Smith 2005; Chenhall et al. 2010; Whitley 1999) 
Formal controls have been identified as an important facet of MCS; they help an  
organization maintain financial viability and develop efficient and effective work processes 
(Chenhall et al. 2010). Formal controls are explicit sets of structures and routines that consist of 
purposefully-designed and information-based processes, to which employees must strictly adhere 
in order to ensure that overall organizational goals are achieved (Bisbe and Otley 2004). Formal 
controls can take several forms, such as performance-based compensation, budgets, performance 
reports, supervisory reviews, segregation of duties, policies and procedures, etc. (Christ et al. 
2012). Formal controls are often used to focus employees’ attention and force dialogue throughout 
an organization. These controls are sometimes used as a diagnostic control system that allow 
managers to ensure important organizational goals are being achieved effectively and efficiently 
(Simons 1995). Despite the benefits of formal controls, they can also have unintended 
consequences, which may be detrimental to the organization (Christ et al. 2012). For example, 
when employees feel their autonomy has been restricted by formal MCS, their level of trust in the 
organization will be impaired, which may result in poor employee cooperation, decreased effort, 
and reduced productivity (Christ et al. 2008).  
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Alternatively, informal controls refer to communication channels that tolerate mistakes, 
enhance bonding, and encourage open-door management policy and information sharing within 
an organization (Chenhall et al. 2010). Informal controls are also known as organic communication 
because they inspire a free flow of information throughout the organization, and promote a flexible 
organizational culture that stimulates an adaptive decision making work environment (Chenhall 
and Morris 1995). Prior research describes informal MCS as implicit sets of structures that 
management adopts to encourage employees to act in a way that aligns with overall organizational 
goals (Berry et al. 2009). Management usually puts informal MCS in place to inspire self-
regulation behaviors among employees; hence, management may not reward or penalize employee 
behavior that is consistent or inconsistent with this informal MCS (Berry et al. 2009; Christ et al. 
2008). Examples of informal MCS that have been examined in prior accounting studies are 
vicarious learning (Choi et al. 2016), employees’ feedback (Christ et al. 2016), organizational 
culture (Chow et al. 2002; Dent 1991; Henri 2006; Pratt and Beaulieu 1992) and organizational 
value statements (Kachelmeier et al. 2015). Out of all these informal MCSs, an organizational 
value statement is one of the informal controls that has not been extensively explored (Kachelmeier 
et al. 2015). However, an organizational value statement should be seen as an important element 
in the organization because it is intended to guide everyday decisions of employees and clarifies 
employees’ expectation within the organization (Urbany 2005). An organizational value statement 
defines the behaviors, attitudes, and character that management is trying to promote among internal 
stakeholders, such as an organization’s employees (Highhouse et al. 2002; Urbany 2005; Wenstøp 
and Myrmel 2006).  
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Organizational Value Statement 
An organizational value statement has been identified as an informal control that can be 
used to exert social pressure on employees within an organization without explicit measures to 
enforce the pressure (O’Reilly III, Chatman and Caldwell 1991). Despite that an organizational 
value statement has no explicit enforcement measures, it helps an organization define its culture 
and beliefs, which reflects a guiding philosophy for employees’ decision-making processes 
(Urbany 2005). The existence of a value statement is not a guarantee that employees will be aware 
of and internalize the value statement (Urbany 2005). As every day decisions in organizations are 
often ambiguous and require some level of professional judgment from employees, the mere 
presence of a value statement may help employees easily resolve ambiguity or even provide 
direction in decision-making (Urbany 2005). 
 An organizational value statement can be broken down into sub-categories that make them 
more comprehensible and serve as a better guide for strategic decision-making.  Comprehensive 
value statements consist of three main value categories: core values, protected values, and created 
values (Wenstøp and Myrmel 2006). Core values refer to the attitude and character of employees 
within an organization. Protected values are values that reflect the organizations’ rules and 
standards, while created values are the expected returns to the stakeholders such as shareholders 
and customers (Wenstøp and Myrmel 2006) . Prior research on value statements focuses on core 
values because this is the category that directly impacts employees’ performance and decision-
making. For example, an excessive organizational emphasis on quality over quantity in the value 
statement could undermine employees’ productivity (Kachelmeier et al. 2015). Specifically, they 
show that an informal management control system in the form of an organizational value statement 
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that focuses on improving quality suppresses employees’ productivity gains through a 
performance-contingent compensation scheme (Kachelmeier et al. 2015).   
Goal regulation is a motivational mindset reflecting the purpose of, or the reason for, a 
course of action (Meyer et al. 2004). Goal regulation theory proposes that employees who are 
internally motivated by the values of the organization will generally perceive themselves as 
working toward the achievement of ideals, while those who are externally motivated will perceive 
themselves as working toward the fulfilment of obligations (Meyer et al. 2004). If employees are 
reminded of the values of the organization, they will exhibit greater intrinsic motivation and are 
more likely to work on uncompensated tasks, compared to those who are not reminded of the 
organization’s values (Urbany 2005). This is expected because, as previously discussed, an 
organizational value statement defines the behaviors and attitude of employees that management 
is trying to promote within an organization (Wenstøp and Myrmel 2006). The value statement will 
provide guidance to the employees when there is no specific information on what is expected of 
them. Hence, employees are more likely to internalize a properly aligned value statement when it 
is present than absent, and this may have long- term implications for employees’ decisions even 
when the economic incentives are no longer available. Using goal regulation theory, this study 
proposes that inclusion of a properly aligned value statement will act as an informal MCS that will 
motivate employees to perform their uncompensated tasks. Following the propositions stated 
above, the following hypothesis is stated: 
H1: Employees will be more productive when completing uncompensated tasks in the 
presence of an organizational value statement as compared to the absence of an 
organizational value statement.  
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Incentive Scheme and Employees’ Decisions 
Prior experimental research has examined whether incentive-based compensation schemes 
can be used to motivate employees to improve their performance. Incentive-based, compared to 
fixed, compensation schemes enhance employees’ performance, and this enhancement can be 
solidified by appropriate feedback and employees’ experience (Sprinkle 2000). Relative to fixed-
pay, incentive-based compensation does not improve, and sometimes even degrades performance 
(Ashton 1990). For example, piece-rate compensation schemes lead to a significant reduction in 
the perceived task attractiveness and worsened task performance compared to fixed-wage 
compensation (Fessler 2003). Similarly, piece-rate incentive schemes undermine self-regulation, 
which can make it difficult for employees to take responsibility for a task that is not directly 
compensated (Frey and Jegen 2001). 
 The results from Kachelmeier et al. (2015) suggest that the presence of an organizational 
value statement improves the quality of employees’ performance and that it can undermine the 
effectiveness of compensation schemes on employees’ productivity. In the presence of a value 
statement emphasizing good quality output, employees will prioritize the quality of their output 
even in the presence of piece-rate incentive compensation that motivates greater quantity of output. 
Further, under piece-rate pay, employees will be more productive without a value statement, but 
the introduction of a value statement negatively affects the efficiency of employees operating 
under a piece-rate incentive. The presence of an informal MCS (a value statement) negatively 
interacts with incentive compensation to undermine productivity (Kachelmeier et al. 2015). 
 Motivation crowding theory states that external intervention via monetary incentives may 
undermine (or crowd out) intrinsic motivation (Frey and Jegen 2001). For example, piece-rate 
incentive compensation may crowd out the notion of responsibility by employees, which may 
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make them less innovative and creative, especially when they are not compensated directly for 
taking the initiative. Organizations use incentive compensation schemes to encourage employees 
to perform their task consistent with organizational goals (Bonner et al. 2000; Bonner and Sprinkle 
2002). One of the limitations of their research is that it does not consider how internally motivated 
the employees will be in the absence of such monetary incentives. If incentives raise employees’ 
motivation to perform tasks, and employees are not directly compensated for performing that 
particular task, they may decide not to take any initiative to perform the task even when the task 
is particularly important to their organization. Despite the benefits of piece-rate incentive schemes 
over fixed pay compensation that has been shown in the literature (Bonner et al. 2000; Kachelmeier 
et al. 2015), my study proposes that there are certain situations where fixed-incentives may be 
more beneficial. Specifically, my study proposes that when employees are not directly 
compensated for performing a task, employees operating under a fixed-pay incentive scheme will 
be more likely to perform the uncompensated task than those compensated by a  piece-rate 
incentive scheme, especially when an organizational value statement is present to intrinsically 
motivate them. Employees operating under a piece-rate incentive scheme will be less intrinsically 
motivated than those operating under a fixed pay scheme. Overjustification effects of monetary 
incentives (Lepper and Greene 1978) will crowd-out employees operating under piece-rate 
incentive more compared to employees operating under a fixed pay incentive. Specifically, the 
second hypothesis is: 
H2: In the presence of an organizational value statement, employees operating under a 
fixed pay incentive scheme are likely to be more productive when performing 
uncompensated tasks than employees operating under a piece-rate incentive scheme. 
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While research on accounting incentives has focused on fixed pay and piece-rate incentive 
schemes (Fessler 2003; Kachelmeier et al. 2015; Sprinkle 2000), another important incentive 
scheme that has not been extensively examined is a quota scheme (Bonner et al. 2000). A quota 
incentive scheme is a hybrid of fixed pay and piece-rate compensation because it has an overall 
link to pay-for-performance, but it does not directly connect pay to each unit of output (Bonner et 
al. 2000; Murthy 2010). For example, employees working under a quota incentive scheme will 
typically receive a fixed pay irrespective of the level of the performance; however, once a 
particular performance target is achieved, the employee will receive payment for each additional 
unit of output. Unlike any other incentive scheme, a quota scheme specifically incorporates an 
explicit assigned goal which provides a benchmark for the bonus reward (Bonner et al. 2000; 
Murthy 2010). As long as the performance target is achievable, a quota scheme may increase 
internal motivation more than a piece-rate incentive scheme. A quota incentive scheme is also 
known as a performance target scheme. A piece-rate incentive scheme is similar to a no-work no-
pay scenario, which signifies that every time an employee performs a task, he/she is expected to 
be remunerated for performing the task. Under the quota scheme, employees are guaranteed a 
particular fixed pay, irrespective of their performance level, although they do not get the bonus 
award if they do not achieve the performance target. 
A complete contract that incentivizes all relevant aspects of an employee’s performance is 
ideal; however, it is not economically feasible (Choi et al. 2016). Thus, it is essential to motivate 
employees to perform a task that will be in the interest of the organization, even when they are not 
directly compensated for performing such a task. Organizations need employees who will take the 
initiative to make decisions that will benefit organizations with or without direct incentive 
compensation. Employees should be willing to create value without direct monetary incentives 
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because the contract that management used to incentivize their employees today may not address 
unforeseen employees’ responsibilities in the future. Management should strive to motivate 
employees beyond traditional methods of monetary incentives. The most valuable employees may 
not be those that perform better with incentives, rather they may be those that are willing to help 
their organizations whenever the need arises with or without direct incentives (Robinson, Kraatz, 
and Rousseau 1994). It may not be ideal for employees to see monetary incentives as the main 
motivation to perform their responsibilities, but they should see monetary incentives as an 
appreciation for performing their responsibilities to the best of their abilities.        
Crowding out theory states that employees will be overshadowed by the monetary 
incentive scheme to the extent that their intrinsic motivation will be depleted when the economic 
incentive is no longer available (Frey and Jegen 2001). A piece-rate incentive scheme will crowd 
out employees’ internal motivation to a greater extent than a quota incentive system as employees 
will expect monetary compensation for every task that they perform. This study proposes that 
when an organizational value statement is present, which serves as an intrinsic motivator, 
employees operating under a piece-rate incentive scheme are less likely to continue to perform 
their uncompensated tasks relative to employees operating under a quota incentive scheme. 
Overjustification effects of piece-rate incentive schemes will be more salient when the economic 
incentives are no longer available compared to quota incentive schemes (Lepper and Greene 1978). 
Therefore, my third hypothesis is:  
H3: In the presence of an organizational value statement, employees operating under a 
quota incentive scheme are likely to be more productive when performing uncompensated 
tasks than employees operating under a piece-rate incentive scheme.    
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Depending on the assigned task and difficulty of performance goal, employees working 
under a quota incentive scheme may be more motivated than employees working under either a 
piece-rate or fixed pay incentive scheme (Bonner et al. 2000). Similarly, perceived task 
attractiveness may also influence the attitude of the employee to the assigned task irrespective of 
the type of incentive (Fessler 2003). However, an employee working under a fixed incentive may 
be more sensitive to the task attractiveness relative to the quota scheme because the quota incentive 
scheme is a combination of both fixed pay and piece-rate incentive schemes.    
Due to the nature of fixed pay incentive and quota schemes, it is difficult to establish the 
scheme that will result in the optimum employee performance in uncompensated task. Employees 
operating under the two incentive schemes will be more intrinsically motivated to perform 
uncompensated task compared to employees operating under a piece-rate. Employees operating 
under quota incentive schemes may be as intrinsically motivated as employees operating under 
fixed pay incentive schemes. Quota incentive schemes include fixed pay, explicit performance 
goals, and performance bonuses (Bonner and Sprinkle 2002); hence, employees will likely see the 
performance bonus as an extra benefit. This implies that employees operating under a quota 
scheme will be less likely to be crowded out with this performance bonus because they feel valued 
by the organization as they see this extra benefit for their effort. Employees operating under a fixed 
pay are more likely to work on their important but uncompensated task because their performance 
is not directly link to their fixed pay. This study expects employees operating under a fixed pay to 
be willing to perform their important task with or without direct incentive compensation. This 
study proposes a research question: which incentive scheme, fixed pay or quota incentive scheme 
will induce better performance in important but uncompensated task? This leads to my formal 
research question: 
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RQ: In the presence of an organizational value statement, which incentive scheme between 
fixed pay and quota schemes will lead to more productive performance of important but 
uncompensated tasks? 
Research Method 
Experimental Design and Task 
This study utilizes a 2x3 between-participants experimental design that manipulates 
organizational value statement and the type of incentive scheme. Specifically, the study 
manipulates the organizational value statement by either having the value statement present or 
absent. The study manipulates incentive scheme by randomly offering participants either fixed 
pay, quota, or piece-rate incentive compensation. The participants are provided a hypothetical case 
about the company and asked to perform a slider task and uncompensated decoding task using z-
Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). Prior research demonstrates that a real effort task provides 
greater external validity over a monetary cost effort task because real effort replicates the exertion 
of effort outside of the laboratory (Gill and Prowse, 2011). This study seeks to use a novel 
computerized real effort task based on moving sliders because the slider task overcomes many 
disadvantages of existing real effort tasks (Gill and Prowse, 2012). The experiment consists of two 
phases: Phase One requires participants to perform one round of practice (unpaid exercise) and 
four rounds of a paid slider task; Phase Two requires participants to perform an uncompensated 
decoding task. 
The experiment is computer-based and administered via z-Tree and Qualtrics software. 
Participants are required to complete the study in the laboratory. They are all assigned their 
individual computer and asked to work independently. The opening screen of the z-Tree study 
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presents the explanation of research and the study overview. Individuals that agree to participate 
proceed to the next screen to begin the study. The second screen informs the participants that they 
will read important information in the next few screens and they are expected to pay maximum 
attention because they will be asked questions to assess their understanding of the material.  
The z-Tree experimental material consists of six sections: background information about a 
hypothetical corporation (KS Upright) and the task instructions, treatment manipulations, 
comprehensive checks, slider task, important information about unpaid decoding task, and the 
decoding task. The Qualtrics experimental material consists of three sections: manipulation 
checks, decision-making questions, and demographics. See Figures 1 and 2 for summaries of the 
experimental procedures in z-Tree and Qualtrics respectively. 
Participants are presented with background information for a hypothetical scenario in 
which they assume the role of an employee of the company named KS Upright. The employees 
are responsible for adjusting sliders between 0 and 100 with the use of their mouse only. They are 
informed that sliders are an important piece of automation equipment that must be successfully 
positioned at exactly 50 on each slider. The task consists of 48 identical sliders which must be 
moved to 50 within 120 seconds. They are able to score points based on the number of sliders 
positioned at exactly 50 at the end of 120 seconds. The score for each round is shown at the center 
top of the screen and the time remaining in any given round is shown in the upper right hand corner 
of the screen. All participants receive the same background information and instructions. See 
Figure 3 for the image of the slider task interface.   
After reading the background information and instructions, the participants move to the 
next screen, the treatment manipulation screen (this is discussed in detail later in the independent 
variable section). They all respond to comprehension checks before moving on to the slider tasks. 
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All participants perform one 60-second practice round to familiarize themselves with the slider 
task before the four working rounds. After each working round, the participants are able to see 
their results before moving on to the next round.  
Once the slider task is completed, the participants receive their total point score and total 
compensation for the study. Thereafter, they are informed that the CEO needs their help with 
decoding tasks which should take about five minutes of their time. They are also notified, that they 
will not be paid for completing this exercise since they have already completed their paid exercise. 
They are further informed that their performance in this decoding task is important to their 
company (KS Upright) but their compensation for participating remains unchanged regardless of 
their performance in the decoding task.         
In the decoding task, participants are instructed to use the keys provided on the left side of 
the screen to correctly identify the number associated with the alphabet showing on their screen. 
If the number is correctly recorded, they will get a point score that is shown on the screen. 
However, if the number is wrong, they will get an error message, but they have unlimited attempts 
to get the correct number. The time that they have remaining in any given round is shown in the 
upper right hand corner of their screen. They have 30 seconds for one practice round and 60 
seconds for the four working rounds. See Figure 4 for the image of decoding task interface. 
After completing all the tasks in z-Tree, the participants are instructed to exit z-Tree and 
open the Qualtrics link on their desktop. On the first page of the Qualtrics, the participants must 
input the unique “lab” number which is provided to them at the beginning of the experiment in 
order to complete the questions and receive their cash compensation at the end of the experiment. 
The participants, thereafter, respond to the manipulation checks, decision-making questions, and 
demographics.  
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Independent Variables 
Compensation Scheme Manipulation 
In this study, I use an experimental currency called “Lira”. Lira is converted into U.S 
dollars at a rate of $1 for every 30,000 Lira and participants are paid in cash at the end of the study. 
The amount they earn depends on their randomly assigned compensation plans and their 
performance on the paid task. The participants in the fixed salary are paid a fixed salary of 240,000 
Lira which is converted to Dollars at the end of the experiment. The participants in the quota 
incentive compensation condition receive a fixed-payment of 45,000 Lira per round plus a 
performance bonus of 1,500 Lira for every slider correctly positioned after the first 10 correctly 
positioned sliders in each round. The participants in the piece-rate incentive compensation receive 
3,000 Lira for each slider they correctly position at 50.    
Value Statement Manipulation 
Half of the participants are randomly assigned to the treatment condition with the value 
statement while the remaining half are randomly assigned to the treatment condition without the 
value statement. For the participants with value statement condition, they have the information 
stating that “before completing your decoding task the CEO would like to remind you of KS 
Upright value statement which emphasizes that: The work YOU do is an important part of the 
success of our company. Together we build systems that work!”. 
Dependent Variable 
The main dependent variable in this study is the participants’ performance in phase two, 
the uncompensated decoding task. In the decoding task, participants have to use the keys provided 
on the left side of the screen to correctly identify the number associated with the alphabet showing 
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on their screen. If the number is correctly recorded they get a point score that will be shown on the 
screen. However, if the number is wrong, they get an error message and they have unlimited 
attempts to get the correct number. The time that each participant has remaining in any given round 
is displayed in the upper right hand corner of the screen. The participants have 30 seconds for one 
practice round and 60 seconds to complete four more rounds.  
Participants 
Participants are recruited from both undergraduate and graduate business classes using a 
multi-contact method. The study was first announced in class, after which students received an 
email containing information on how to sign-up for the laboratory experiment. As an incentive for 
participating, extra credit opportunities were offered to the students that participated in this study 
in addition to their incentive compensation (which depends on their compensation plan as well as 
their task performance). Alternative assignments were also offered to the students that decided not 
to participate but were interested in the extra credit opportunities. One hundred and thirty useable 
responses are included in the analysis. In order to be eligible to participate in the study, participants 
must be eighteen years of age or above. The majority of the participants are female (52.3 percent). 
Most participants are between 21-25 years old (47 percent), with others age 18-20 (30 percent), 
age 26-30 (9 percent), age 31-35 (9 percent), and over age 35 (5 percent). Most of the participants 
(65 percent) have 1-5 years of work experience, with 13 percent of participants having 6-10 years 
of work experience 6-10, and 7 percent having 11 years and over of work experience. Eighteen 
percent have no work experience and 1 percent did not respond. The majority of participants are 
accounting majors (86.9 percent). Most of the participants are classified as juniors (43.1 percent) 
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with the remainder classified as seniors (33.8 percent), graduate students (17.1 percent), 
sophomores (3.1 percent), and freshmen (2.3 percent). Table 1 presents demographic data.  
Result 
Descriptive Statistics 
The focus of this study is employees’ uncompensated task performance; hence, the main 
dependent variable of interest is the number of letters that the participants are able to decode 
without any incentive compensation. Table 2 Panel A presents descriptive statistics of 
uncompensated task performance across the six treatment conditions. In the fixed pay condition, 
the mean (standard deviation) of uncompensated decoding task performance is 117.71 letters 
decoded (24.61) when the value statement is present, and 95.60 letters decoded (16.90) when the 
value statement is absent. In the piece rate incentive pay condition, the mean (standard deviation) 
of uncompensated decoding task performance is 95.10 letters decoded (15.57) when the value 
statement is present, and 107.83 letters decoded (18.42) when the value statement is absent. In the 
quota incentive pay condition, the mean (standard deviation) of uncompensated decoding task 
performance is 92.85 letters decoded (10.07) when the value statement is present, and 95.45 letters 
decoded (11.48) when the value statement is absent. The total uncompensated task performance 
mean (standard deviation) is 102.75 letters decoded (21.39) when the value statement is present 
and 99.88 (16.73) when the value statement is absent.    
Test of Hypotheses 
 H1 posits that employees are more likely to be more productive when performing 
uncompensated task when they have the value statement to motivate them compared to when the 
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value statement is not available. Specifically, H1 predicts that employees will be more productive 
when performing uncompensated tasks in the presence of an organizational value statement as 
compared to the absence of an organizational value statement. To test this conclusion statistically, 
Table 2 Panel B reports overall ANOVA findings (also see Figure 5). Although in the predicted 
direction, the result shows that the total uncompensated task performance mean (102.75) when the 
value statement is present is not significantly different from the total uncompensated task 
performance mean (99.88) when the value statement is absent (F = 0.562, p= 0.228, one tailed). 
Further analysis was carried out to understand the effect of the value statement under different 
incentive structures and interesting results emerged.  
Planned contrasts of the value statement and no value statement performance depending 
on incentive structure show significant results (see Table 2 Panel C and Figure 6). Specifically, 
participants’ uncompensated task performance under a fixed pay incentive scheme when the value 
statement is present (117.71) is significantly better (t = 3.517, p < 0.001, one tailed) than 
uncompensated task performance when the value statement is absent (95.60). This shows that the 
introduction of a value statement helps improve participants’ performance significantly when they 
operate under fixed pay. Conversely, participants’ uncompensated task performance under a piece 
rate incentive when the value statement is present (92.85) is significantly lower (t = -2.483, p = 
0.009, one tailed) than uncompensated task performance under a piece rate incentive when the 
value statement absent. This result is similar to the result of Kachelmeier et al. (2015) that show a 
significant interaction between piece-rate incentives and value statement, with significant 
monetary incentive effects in the absence of the value statement but no visible monetary incentive 
effects when value statement is present. My study is different from Kachelmeier et al. (2015) 
because it considers uncompensated task performance while Kachelmeier et al. (2015) focus on 
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compensated task performance. The explanation for the result of this hypothesis could be that since 
this is an uncompensated subsequent task and the participants are on piece-rate compensation, 
hence the presence of the value statement reminded the participants that they are not going to be 
compensated for this particular task, despite the importance of this task to the organization. Hence 
the participants under piece-rate are crowded by their incentive schemes and the present of value 
statement increases the crowding out effect on subsequent uncompensated tasks performance. This 
study further explores planned contrasts of a value statement and no value statement on quota 
incentive, and there is no significant difference in uncompensated task performance (t = -0.783, p 
= 0.219, one tailed). 
H2 posits that when employees are not directly compensated for performing a task, 
employees operating under a fixed pay scheme are more likely to be productive when performing 
uncompensated task than those compensated by a piece-rate incentive scheme, especially when an 
organizational value statement is present. Specifically, because of a crowding out effect of piece-
rate incentive scheme, my study predicts that in the presence of an organizational value statement, 
employees operating under a fixed pay incentive scheme are likely to be more productive when 
performing uncompensated tasks than employees operating under a piece-rate incentive scheme. 
Table 3 Panel A reports the ANOVA results with uncompensated task performance as the 
dependent variable. The model is statistically significant at p < 0.001. Table 3 Panel B reports the 
contrast for H2. As predicted, in the presence of the value statement, participants operating under 
a fixed pay incentive scheme are more productive than participants operating under a piece-rate 
incentive scheme (t = 3.729, p < 0.001, one tailed). 
H3 posits that in the presence of an organizational value statement, employees operating 
under a quota incentive scheme are likely to be more productive than employees operating under 
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a piece-rate incentive scheme. The results in Table 3 Panel B show that in the presence of an 
organizational value statement, employees operating under a quota incentive are not significantly 
more productive than employees operating under a piece-rate incentive scheme (p = 0.293). Hence, 
employees operating under a piece-rate incentive are not more crowded out by their compensation 
scheme as compared to employees operating under a quota compensation scheme. The result does 
not support my predicted hypothesis. 
 RQ asks in the presence of an organizational value statement, which incentive scheme 
between fixed pay and quota schemes will lead to better performance in important but 
uncompensated task? This is proposed as a research question because the performance target 
component of the quota incentive pay may negatively impact employees’ behavior, leading to less 
optimum performance relative to fixed pay. Table 3 Panel B reports the results of the planned 
contrasts for RQ, which shows that in the presence of an organizational value statement, 
uncompensated task performance differs significantly (p<0.001, two tailed) when employees are 
compensated with fixed-pay relative to a quota. Examining the means for each incentive scheme 
in the presence of a value statement shows that employees under fixed pay are more productive in 
the uncompensated task than the quota employees2. See Figure 7 for the graphical representation 
of H2, H3 and RQ. 
Manipulation and Comprehension Checks 
 I asked participants a series of questions before they began the slider task regarding: (1) 
whether they will be paid for completing the four rounds of slider task after the practice round; (2) 
                                                 
2 I carried out additional analysis on demographic factors and none of the demographic factors influence the 
participants’ answers. 
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the type of incentive they are eligible to receive; (3) whether they were provided with KS Upright 
value statement; (4) whether they will be paid for completing the four rounds of decoding task. 
Participants could not proceed to the slider and decoding tasks until they had answered each 
question correctly. The manipulation check is conducted later in the experiment to provide 
assurance that the participants are aware of the facts that are vital to the successful 
operationalization of the variable. To verify the manipulation of the incentives, the participants are 
asked, “Prior to positioning the sliders, you were given information about the compensation you 
were eligible to receive for completing the task. Which type of compensation were you eligible to 
receive?” Participants are asked the correct position to earn point for each slider in every round. A 
total of 9 participants failed the two manipulation check questions and excluding them from the 
analysis did not change the results of the study. Hence, they are included in the analysis.    
Conclusion 
This study examines the effect of a nonbinding value statement on employees’ performance 
on an important but uncompensated task. Prior literature has shown that incentive contracts cannot 
completely govern all employees’ responsibilities (Christ et al. 2012) and using economic 
incentives to explicitly stimulate expected behavior is desirable, but it is often difficult to achieve 
(Choi et al. 2016). In view of the position of prior literature on incentive contracts and employees’ 
responsibilities, it is important to examine how organizations can use informal management 
control systems such as organizational value statements to compliment economic incentives in 
order to ensure that employees perform their important but uncompensated tasks. The study draws 
upon goal regulation theory, which proposes that employees who view their behavior as more 
internally driven by the values of the organization will perceive themselves as working towards 
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the accomplishment of ideals, while employees who view their behavior as more externally driven 
by incentive compensation will perceive themselves as working toward the fulfilment of 
obligations (Meyer et al. 2004). I predict that employees will be more productive when performing 
uncompensated tasks in the presence of an organizational value statement as compared to the 
absence of an organizational value statement. I do not find support for this hypothesis, however, 
further analysis of the individual incentive compensation shows interesting results. The results 
show that under a fixed pay compensation, the effect of a nonbinding value statement is more 
pronounced in uncompensated task performance, to the extent that participants are more 
productive when the value statement is present as compared to when the value statement is absent. 
This implies that the presence of a value statement motivates employees that are being 
compensated with fixed pay to be more productive in an uncompensated task.  
 Similar to Kachelmeier et al. (2015), I find an interesting result in the analysis of a piece-
rate incentive with and without a value statement. The results show that in the absence of the value 
statement, employees are more likely to perform their uncompensated task better compared to the 
presence of the value statement. Employees working under a piece-rate incentive focus so much 
on the incentive pay associated with their performance and any form of informal management 
control systems could negatively affect their performance because it will remind them that they 
are not being compensated for performing this task. However, employees working under a fixed 
pay will usually work at their own pace because their incentive compensation is not associated 
with their performance. Hence, any form of motivational techniques such as informal management 
control system will encourage them to be more productive in their important but uncompensated 
task. The implication of this finding is that value statements can be used to motivate employees 
operating under a fixed pay to perform important tasks either compensated or uncompensated. 
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However, companies should be very careful when they are trying to motivate factory floor 
employees because the motivational techniques such as informal management control systems 
could lead to dysfunctional behavior.   
Organizations invest in the creation and dissemination of value statements in order to 
manage external impressions and reputation (Urbany 2005); however, they pay little or no 
attention to improving internal productivity with the use of organizational value statements 
(Highhouse et al. 2002). If an organization values all the information included in their value 
statement, then they could make an effort to effectively communicate their values to their 
employees, especially employees that are on a fixed pay. This may encourage the employees to 
consciously or subconsciously believe in those values and live by those values. Employees should 
be interested in knowing the value statements all the time, not just when they have interactions 
with the human resource department. The value statements should be used proactively to clarify 
expectations from employees. 
This study contributes to the literature in several important ways. First, the study extends 
the contribution of Kachelmeier et al. (2015) by examining the effect of nonbinding organizational 
value statements on employees’ performance in an important but uncompensated task. This study 
is important because it is the first study that specifically examines the effect of the type of incentive 
structure on employees’ performance on an important but uncompensated task. Technology has 
drastically influenced the way organizations maintain their competitive advantage; hence, 
organizations need to recruit and retain employees that believe in the values of the company 
because it is very difficult to incentivize all aspects of employees’ responsibilities (Choi et al 
2016). Investigating the reactions of employees under different incentive structures to perform 
important but uncompensated tasks provide a unique contribution to managerial accounting 
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literature. Second, while Kachelmeier et al. (2015) examine the fixed pay and piece rate incentive 
compensations, my study investigates fixed pay, piece-rate, and quota incentive compensations. 
Quota incentive compensation has not been extensively explored in managerial accounting 
literature. Despite the benefit of quota incentive compensation that has been identified in some 
literature, it is still difficult to examine quota incentive compensation using a laboratory 
experiment.  
    My results also suggest several avenues for future research. First, I use a laboratory 
experiment for this study and it is difficult to disentangle the effect of fixed pay and bonus pay 
components of quota incentive compensation. Future research can examine this research question 
using a field experiment. Field experiments may help our understanding of the effect of quota 
incentive compensation on important but uncompensated tasks. Similarly, field experiments will 
address external validity issues with the organizational value statement. Second, I use student 
participants in my study.  Using actual employees in future research could make incentive 
compensation more salient. 
 Notwithstanding its limitations, this study extends management control literature 
by establishing the type of incentive compensation that results in employees’ productive 
performance on important but uncompensated tasks. Also, the study supports Kachelmeier et al. 
2015 by reinforcing the importance of nonbinding organizational value statements under different 
incentive structures.         
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STUDY TWO: THE IMPACT OF INCENTIVE SYSTEMS AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL VALUE STATEMENT DELIVERY ON 
EMPLOYEES’ PERFORMANCE 
Introduction 
The ultimate goal of a management control system in most organizations is to align 
employee behavior with the overall organizational objectives, and to promote effective and 
efficient use of organizational resources (Chenhall 2003). Management control systems consist of 
any actions or activities undertaken by management to influence the likelihood that employees will 
conduct themselves in ways which lead to the achievement of organizational objectives (Berry, 
Coad, Harris, Otley and Stringer 2009; Chenhall 2003; Malmi and Brown 2008; Otley and Berry 
1980). These actions and activities can be broadly divided into formal and informal management 
controls. Formal controls consist of explicit preventive or detective management control activities 
such as performance measurement systems (Christ, Emett, Summers and Wood 2012). Informal 
controls, on the other hand, are implied by social pressures, such as feedback, and management 
communication, such as a value statement or the organizational culture, where no explicit 
enforcement measures exist (Berry et al. 2009; Kachelmeier, Thornock and Williamson 2015). 
Organizational culture is a set of values, beliefs, and social norms which tend to be shared by an 
organization’s members and in turn, influence their thoughts and actions (Flamholtz, Das, and Tsui 
1985). It is an important form of informal management control system that can be used to regulate 
employees’ behavior (Malmi and Brown 2008). For an organization to imbue its culture into its 
employees’ behaviors, it must be able to effectively communicate its core values to all employees 
and provide amalgamating direction for the organization. The communication of an organization’s 
core values is often done with the use of a value statement.  
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While prior research has shown that the presence of an organizational value statement 
focusing on quality improvement can have negative effects on employees’ overall productivity 
under a piece-rate incentive scheme (Kachelmeier et al. 2015), prior research has not examined 
whether the interactive delivery of an organizational value statement can impact the salience of 
the value statement. A value statement that is more salient may lead to improved employees’ 
performance irrespective of the focus of the value statement on quality or quantity improvement. 
Specifically, whether organizations can use interactive delivery of informal management controls 
(a value statement), combined with formal management controls (incentive systems) to improve 
employees’ performance is unknown. Further, the extent to which interactive delivery of a value 
statement can improve employees’ performance under different incentive systems is also 
unknown. Promoting an organization’s value statement can be used to constantly remind 
employees of the importance of an organization’s values (Highhouse, Hoffman, Greve and Collins 
2002). Interactive delivery of this value statement, which gives employees opportunity to relate 
continuously with the value statement, may make employees more aware of the objectives of the 
organization. At the same time, management may use this interactive delivery of value statement 
to promote the culture of the organization.  
 The purpose of this study is to examine whether the interactive delivery of a value 
statement (informal control) can be used in conjunction with an incentive scheme (formal control) 
to improve employees’ performance. There are different methods of delivering an organizational 
value statement. The popular method is the passive approach of delivering an organizational value 
statement through employee handbooks, organizational websites, and souvenirs (Wenstøp and 
Myrmel 2006). Another popular passive method used by some corporate organizations is framing 
the organizational value statement and placing it on the office walls (Highhouse et al., 2002). 
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However, the potential problem with these passive methods of delivery is that employees’ attention 
may not be drawn to the value statement. This passive delivery of the value statement may not 
proactively align employees’ behaviors with the organizational values. However, interactive 
delivery is a continuous presentation of the organizational value statement to the employees. The 
value statement can be integrated electronically into employees’ computers in order to provide 
continuous interactive delivery. This interactive delivery will provide a continuous reminder to the 
employees of what is important to the organization. Interactive delivery can also stimulate 
organizational culture and promote organizational performance.  
Prior accounting research shows that the method of delivery of information influences 
employees’ decisions. Specifically, Arnold et al. (2006) show that the presentation format of 
information can influence employees’ decision-making in a variety of ways, depending on the 
user’s level of expertise and the nature of the information. Technology provides new, interactive 
approaches to address contemporary issues (O’Donnell and David 2000). O’Donnell and David 
(2000) hypothesize that technologically integrating a value statement creates an interactive way of 
delivering a value statement to employees, while the traditional approach is a passive way of 
delivering the value statement. Through electronic integration of the value statement, employees 
will more frequently interact with the value statement compared to the employees with the 
traditional passive method of delivery. The potential benefit of interactive delivery over the passive 
delivery is that interactive delivery is more of a proactive than reactive method of delivery, 
provides timely reinforcement of organizational objectives to employees, and may improve 
performance. 
According to mere exposure effect, repeated exposure of an individual to a stimulus object 
enhances his or her attitude toward the object (Zajonc 1968). Mere exposure is a psychological 
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phenomenon also referred to as familiarity principle. This is a situation where an individual 
develops a preference for an object merely because they have consistent exposure to that object. 
This study hypothesizes that the interactive delivery of an organizational value statement enhances 
employees’ attitudes toward the value statement compared to passive delivery of the value 
statement. I expect this enhancement in employees’ attitudes to help better align employees’ 
performance with the goals of the organization. Electronically integrating a value statement into 
employees’ daily activities will make the value statement more salient compared to the traditional 
approach of hanging the value statement on the office walls (Erik and Robert 2002; Kacmar, 
Zivnuska, and Gully 2003). There is a higher likelihood that employees mental arousal will be 
influenced when they interact with  a value statement and they will better internalize the 
organization’s values (Gardner 1986). Additionally, piece-rate incentive schemes activate 
employees’ alertness (Gardner 1986). Thus, this study hypothesizes that a piece-rate incentive 
scheme will be more effective in motivating employees to perform compared to a fixed pay 
scheme. Furthermore, I hypothesize that the delivery method will moderate the impact of the 
compensation scheme such that employees operating under a fixed pay with interactive delivery 
will perform more like employees operating under a piece-rate compensation, but employees with 
fixed pay and passive delivery will perform worse than any of the other three conditions.  
 To examine these hypotheses, I conduct an experiment which involves a 2 (method of value 
statement delivery: interactive vs passive) x 2 (incentive structure: fixed pay vs piece-rate) between 
subject design. I recruit seventy-seven undergraduate business students at a large university to 
participate in this study. The participants are randomly assigned to four conditions, and they are 
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required to perform a decoding task3 in z-Tree (Gill and Prowse 2011). All participants are given 
eight rounds of the decoding task and have 60 seconds per round to complete as many decoding 
exercises as possible. The participants under the passive delivery of the value statement received 
the value statement as part of the instructions before beginning the decoding task. However, the 
participants in the interactive delivery of the value statement received the value statement four 
times, at the beginning of every two rounds, and they were required to acknowledge reading the 
value statement before proceeding to the next round. 
 I do not find support that the method of delivery of an organizational value statement 
impacts employees’ performance. However, further analysis shows partial support for the positive 
effect of interactive delivery of value statement in fixed pay compensation on employee’s 
performance. I do find support that the type of incentive scheme impacts employees’ performance. 
Employees operating under a piece-rate incentive scheme perform significantly better than 
employees operating under a fixed pay incentive scheme. Similarly, I find an interaction effect for 
the method of delivery of an organizational value statement and incentive pay on employees’ 
performance. Specifically, employees operating under fixed pay with interactive delivery of an 
organizational value statement perform more like employees operating under a piece-rate 
compensation. Also as predicted, employees operating under fixed pay with passive delivery of an 
organizational value statement perform significantly worse than employees operating under any 
of the other three conditions. This implies that the interactive method of delivery of an 
organizational value statement has a significant effect on employees operating under a fixed pay 
compensation.   
                                                 
3 The decoding task instrument is adapted from Weiming Liu dissertation, University of Waterloo. I would like to 
thank Weiming for sharing his decoding task z-Tree codes with me. 
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This study contributes to the management control literature by demonstrating how utilizing 
technology can enhance the delivery of an organization’s value statement and ultimately improve 
employees’ performance. This study also seeks to connect informal management controls to formal 
management controls by systematically implementing informal management controls that reassure 
employees what the organization appreciates and rewards. Another contribution of this study is 
that it provides empirical evidence that an organizational value statement can influence employees’ 
performance under a fixed pay incentive scheme through the interactive delivery of the value 
statement, without increasing employees’ monetary incentives or changing their incentive 
structure. This study helps create awareness that formal management control systems can be used 
in conjunction with informal management control systems to improve employees’ performance. 
This study also contributes to the management accounting literature by introducing the mere 
exposure psychological effect to the management control literature. Lastly, this study addresses a 
call for future research that investigates the effects of an organizational value statement and other 
informal controls on employees’ performance (Berry et al., 2009; Kachelmeier et al., 2015). This 
study is different from Kachelmeier et al. (2015) in two ways. First my study examines the 
combined effect of value statement delivery and the incentive system on employees’ performance, 
while Kachelmeier et al. (2015) examines the effect of the presence versus absence of the value 
statement. Second, my study focuses on the moderating effect of the organizational value statement 
delivery method and employee incentive scheme on employee performance, while Kachelmeier et 
al. (2015) focus on moderating effect of presence of value statement on piece-rate employees.   
The paper proceeds as follows: The next two sections discuss the relevant background 
literature and develops the hypotheses. Section IV discusses the experimental method and design. 
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Lastly, section V provides the results, and section VI discusses the conclusion and opportunities 
for future research. 
Theory and Hypotheses Development 
Background 
One of the goals of every organization is to motivate employees to exhibit behaviors that 
align with the organization’s objectives (Benston 1963). Management needs to introduce and 
incorporate the culture of their organization into their employees’ everyday work life. 
Management’s responsibility is to encourage employees to internalize the culture of the 
organization formally and/or informally. One method of encouraging employees to imbibe the 
culture of an organization is through consistent communication of the organization’s value 
statement (Highhouse et al. 2002). This is an example of motivating employees through conscious 
goal setting (Locke 1996). There are many ways to inform employees that a particular 
organizational goal is important, such as recognition and rewards from management (Locke 1996). 
Employees’ behavior can be aligned with organizational goals through proper leadership 
techniques, such as providing and effectively communicating an inspiring organizational value 
statement or promoting employees who embrace the value statement and dismissing those who 
reject it (Locke 1996).        
Determining how to effectively motivate employees to work toward the firm’s goals has 
long been one of management’s most important and vexing problems (Benston 1963). One of the 
challenges of motivating employees is that intrinsic motivation may be difficult to observe 
(Latham and Locke 1979). The effectiveness of motivational techniques depends on management 
style, organizational structure, and organizational culture (Benston 1963). A method of getting 
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employees attention is through goal setting (Terborg and Miller 1978). Establishing a goal for 
employees implies that management can incorporate the goal of the organization into the 
management style and culture of the organization. This is often done through the creation of a 
value statement that all employees are expected to follow. Value statements influence employee 
performance by affecting the direction of their action and the persistence of that action over time 
(Locke 1996; Urbany 2005). 
Motivating employees to behave in a way that is aligned with organizational goals is not 
an indicator that the organization’s goals have been met, but merely a step to ensure that 
employees’ judgment and decision-making are properly aligned with the organization’s overall 
objectives (Hackman and Oldham 1976). Management is ultimately interested in employees’ 
productive behaviors. Employee behavior has implications for organizational performance 
(Huselid 1995). For example, Farrell, Kadous and Towry (2012) investigate whether 
communication about causal linkages between actions today and performance tomorrow improves 
employee effort allocations and firm performance. Their results suggest that communicating a 
qualitative linkage between quality today and financial performance tomorrow significantly 
increases quality-related effort, thus increasing overall firm performance (Farrell et al. 2012). This 
helps explain why organizations incorporate and communicate specific performance measures in 
employment contracts (Farrell, Kadous and Towry 2008), as this focuses employees’ effort to align 
with the goals of the organization.   
Management control systems, which include both preventive and detective controls, can 
be used to encourage employees to align their behavior with the overall organizational goal to help 
achieve an organization’s performance target (Chenhall 2003; Malmi and Brown 2008; Tucker, 
Thorne and Gurd 2006). Preventive controls are controls that deter problems before they arise, 
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while detective controls are controls designed to discover problems after they occur (Christ et al. 
2012). Preventive and detective controls have different effects on employee performance and 
motivation. Specifically, compared to detective controls, preventive controls restrict employees’ 
autonomy but provide more timely feedback (Christ et al. 2012). Thus, employees operating under 
preventive controls perform better on a controlled dimension of a task than those operating under 
detective controls (Christ et al. 2012). These findings suggest that the timeliness of the feedback 
provided by a formal control is an important element that influences employee performance and 
judgment and decision-making (Christ et al. 2012). Similarly, prior research examines how 
employees’ performance on multidimensional tasks differs under different control structures. The 
results of Christ et al. (2016) suggest that employee performance on a multidimensional task is 
higher when firms compensate employees on only one dimension of the task and provide feedback 
on the other dimension compared to when firms compensate on both dimensions of the task. 
Incentive contracts have been identified as a means of motivating employees’ effort and 
improving firm performance (Choi, Hecht and Tayler 2012; Christ et al. 2012; Church, Libby and 
Zhang 2008; Libby and Lipe 1992; Pratt and Awasthi 1990). While incentive systems are a formal 
management control  system that can be used to enforce quality standards, other informal 
management control systems can be used to exert social pressure to improve employees’ 
performance (Berry et al. 2009). For example, Kachelmeier et al. (2015) investigate whether a 
value statement  focused on accuracy influences the effect that a compensation scheme has on 
employee productivity. The results of their experimental investigation suggest that the inclusion 
of an accuracy focused value statement improves the quality of employees output at the expense 
of a corresponding loss of productivity. Kachelmeier et al. (2015) differentiate between 
productivity and output by defining productivity as output that meets quality standards and output 
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as volume of activity. The authors suggest that future research could investigate the effects of an 
organizational value statement and other informal controls on employees’ motivation, judgment 
and decision-making, and overall performance (Kachelmeier et al. 2015). 
Method of Delivery of Value Statement and Employees Performance  
Organizations create value by attracting, recruiting, and retaining employees that exhibit 
behaviors that align with the organization’s goals (Benston 1963; Lepak, Smith and Taylor 2007). 
To create value, organizations must be able to communicate their value statement effectively to all 
their stakeholders and, more importantly, their employees. This suggests that organizations need 
to be value focused in all of their activities (Lepak et al. 2007). A value focused organization can 
be described as any organization that is able to clearly define, communicate, and structure their 
fundamental values in terms of objectives in order to guide decision making (Keeney 1994, 1996). 
Organizational value statements that are found in different places on company websites may be 
difficult to sort out, and confusing with regard to value categories (Wenstøp and Myrmel 2006). 
Prior literature shows that clarifying and explicitly stating organizational strategic objectives 
should have a high benefit-to-effort ratio (Keeney 1996). Specifically, Keeney (1996) proposes 
that organizational strategic objectives need to be clear and must be written down for further 
clarification. Organizations should give employees opportunities to interact with the 
organizational value statement on a more frequent basis. 
Value statements impact decision making in organizations (Urbany 2005). Urbany (2005) 
investigates the impact of a value statement on the everyday decision making of employees within 
an organization. The results from the survey suggest that the adoption of a value statement is 
intended to guide everyday decisions of an organization’s management and employees. The value 
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statement is also intended to influence the perceptions of external stakeholders (Urbany 2005). 
Further, Kachelmeier et al. (2015) show that merely the presence of a value statement improves 
employee’s focus on the quality of their productive output.  
After the development of a value statement, management is responsible for effective 
communication of the value statement to all employees and external stakeholders. The traditional 
method of delivering the value statement to employees is through the employees’ handbook, value 
statement cards, or through other organizational souvenirs given to employees during their first 
week at the organization (Wenstøp and Myrmel 2006). Management of some organizations will 
go to the extent of framing the organization’s value statement and placing it on the walls 
throughout the office building in order to communicate the organization’s values to their 
employees (Highhouse et al. 2002). Although management is carrying out these traditional 
methods of communicating the value statement, this does not necessarily guarantee that employees 
are cognizant of these values. While management can give the employee a handbook that contains 
the value statement, it is difficult to ensure that employees interact with the value statement on a 
regular basis, as employees may not frequently read their employee handbook. The traditional 
method of communicating to the employee, as described above, is passive because it does not 
insure that employees interact regularly with the value statement.  
Research has shown that electronic integration of information can make the information 
more salient and improve decision-making. For example, Arnold et al. (2006) examine the 
electronic delivery of explanations in an intelligent decision support system. The results show that 
users are more likely to adhere to recommendations of the decision support systems when an 
explanation facility is available. Information and communication technologies and their impact on 
control system design and capability has received limited attention in prior research (Berry et al. 
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2009). Information and communication technologies can enhance the delivery of a value statement 
within an organization. Electronic integration of a value statement can be used to make the value 
statement more interactive. Also, electronic integration of a value statement can facilitate diffusion 
of information which can make the value statement more noticeable and prominent to employees 
(Rogers 1995).    
The mere exposure effect occurs when an individual is repeatedly exposed to a particular 
stimulus object, and develops a preference for that object (Zajonc 2001). The mere exposure effect 
states that the mere repeated exposure of an individual to a stimulus object enhances his or her 
attitude toward the object (Zajonc 1968). This psychological phenomenon is also known as the 
familiarity principle, where an individual develops a preference for an object merely because they 
have consistent exposure to that object (Zajonc 1968). Prior research has established that repeated 
exposure to information can lead to the formation of a preference, thus enhancing positive affect 
(Zajonc 2001). For the mere exposure effect to occur, an individual is not required to engage in 
any special behavior; the stimulus just must be accessible to the individual’s sensory receptors. 
Repeated exposure of a stimulus is sufficient for the enhancement of a preference for that stimulus 
(Zajonc 2001). The interactive delivery of a value statement is a way to make the value statement 
more salient by drawing employees’ attention to it. When an employee’s attention is drawn to the 
value statement through interactive delivery, salience of the value statement should increase 
(Wright and Anderson 1989). The increased salience should motivate employees to develop 
positive affect towards the statement. Positive affect generated by the interactive delivery of a 
value statement will subconsciously influence an attitude change in the employees, and this will 
inspire employees to perform better (Wegener, Petty, Detweiler-Bedell and Jarvis 2001).   
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A message is salient when it is prominent, important, and noticeable. As an object becomes 
more salient, it becomes more relevant and accessible, and it moves from being perceived as a 
passive object to a more interactive object (Erik and Robert 2002; Kacmar, Zivnuska, Witt, Gully 
2003). An organization can make a value statement more salient by incorporating it into the daily 
activities of the employees. For example, this could be accomplished through the electronic 
integration of the value statement into an organization’s computer systems. Presumably, when a 
value statement is electronically integrated, the employees’ interaction with the value statement 
increases. The more the employees interact with the value statement, the more likely they are to 
develop positive affect towards it (Zajonc 2001), thus influencing their performance (Janke, 
Mahlendorf, and Weber 2014; Wegener et al. 2001). By implementing an interactive electronic 
integration of a value statement, an organization can remind the employee of the values of the 
organization anytime the employee logs into their computer system.  
The goal of the value statement is to remind employees what the company stands for, as 
well as what is important to the organization. Incorporating a value statement into daily activities, 
for example through electronic integration, will give employees an understanding of how 
important it is that they align their actions with the value statement. This will help align employees’ 
decisions with the overall organizational goal. Making an organization’s value statement salient 
entails more than making employees aware of the values. It must also ensure that employees 
emulate those values. An interactive value statement facilitates persuasion, an informal social 
control mechanism (Schaler 2013), since employees tend to develop positive affect either 
consciously or subconsciously as a result of the mere exposure effect of the interactive value 
statement.  
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Interactive information is more salient to employees than passive information (Erik and 
Robert 2002), thus enhancing employees’ positive affect towards the information (Zajonc 1968). 
The interactive nature of the value statement through electronic integration will motivate 
employees to develop positive affect towards the value statement. This electronic integration will 
result in better alignment of the employees’ judgment and decision-making with the organizational 
goals compared to the traditional passive method of delivery, thus increasing employee 
performance. The value statement becomes more concrete and accessible when it is electronically 
integrated into employees’ daily activities through their work computers (Freitas, Gollwitzer and 
Trope 2004). Computers are the official working tools of employees in an organization and there 
is a decreasing number of employees working in an organization without the aid of a computer 
(Gosse 1993; Janvrin, Bierstaker and Lowe 2009). In most cases, employees are required to use 
their personal credentials to log in to their work computer. As a result, employees will be more 
aware of the value statement when integrated into a computer login than through the passive 
method of including the value statement in employees’ handbooks. If employees are more 
frequently reminded of the organizational value statement, they are more likely to internalize the 
value statement and develop positive affect toward the value statement. Given the propositions 
stated above, the following hypothesis is stated: 
H1: Employees will be more productive when a value statement is delivered interactively 
compared to when it is delivered passively.    
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Incentive Systems, Value Statement, and Employees’ Performance 
Prior literature has identified that there is a significant relationship between individual’s 
incentives, effort, and performance (Bonner and Sprinkle 2002). Specifically, Bonner and Sprinkle 
(2002) establish a four dimensional theoretical framework explaining how effort can influence 
performance including direction, duration, intensity of effort, and strategy development (Bonner 
and Sprinkle 2002). Incentive systems can serve as a formal management control system to 
motivate employees to exert effort in executing their tasks. Incentives systems must be properly 
aligned to the organizational values in order to obtain desired employee behavior, as improper 
alignment may result in dysfunctional outcomes (Ashton 1990; Libby and Lipe 1992; Pratt and 
Awasthi 1990; Tuttle and Burton 1999).  Cognitive processes involved in accounting judgment 
tasks influence the effect that various types of incentive systems have on employees’ effort. 
Specifically, piece rate incentive schemes increase the duration and consistency of encoding effort 
relative to fixed pay incentive schemes. This increased effort improves performance on a recall 
task to a greater extent than performance on a recognition task (Libby and Lipe 1992). The 
implication of this study is that a piece-rate incentive motivates employees to exert more cognitive 
effort on an assigned task in order to maximize their incentive pay.  
Although performance-based incentives encourage employees to be more motivated to 
perform their assigned tasks, there are some essential conditions for the effectiveness of this impact 
(Bonner et al. 2000). One condition is the level of the employee in the organization. For example, 
monetary incentives based on performance may only be effective to motivate lower-level 
employees and not higher-level employees. The impact of incentives depends on the type and 
amount of the incentive, and, more importantly, the task structure and the knowledge of the 
decision maker (Libby and Lipe 1992). Salient features of accounting settings may moderate the 
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influence of monetary incentives, including employee skill, task complexity, assigned goal, and 
rewarded dimensions of performance (Bonner and Sprinkle 2002). Increases in effort due to 
incentives may not improve employees’ performance and decisions, particularly if the employees 
do not have the required skill set to effectively execute the task or do not have the appropriate level 
of motivation (Bonner and Sprinkle 2002).  
 Management must be cognizant of the organization’s ultimate performance goal when 
designing the employee compensation scheme. Depending on the result that the organization is 
striving to achieve, different compensation schemes will result in different motivating effects on 
employees’ performance and decisions. If the goal of the organization is to improve quantity with 
little or no regards for quality, effort inducing monetary incentive systems can motive employees 
to keep producing. On the contrary, if the goal of the organization is to improve the quality of the 
employees’ output, then management may have to reconsider the structure of their incentive 
systems to be more of a quality result oriented approach. Quantity incentives encourage employees 
to be more productive whereas creativity incentives encourage employees to improve their average 
creativity at the expense of productivity (Kachelmeier, Reichert, and Williamson, 2008). The 
implication of these findings is that if creativity is quantifiable and relevant to the firm’s goals, 
incorporating creativity measures in a multidimensional assessment and performance incentive 
scheme can have the unintended consequence of reducing less-creative performance without 
necessarily improving creative output performance.  
  Activation theory suggests that mental arousal is essential to effectively motivate 
employees and to alert employees to their task performance (Gardner 1986). Employees seek this 
activation through various types of stimulation (Gardner 1986). Compensation schemes are one of 
the important stimuli that can be used to activate employees alertness and commitment to their 
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assigned tasks (Fessler 2003). Prior literature has shown that different compensation schemes have 
different effects on employees’ performance (Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002; Cianci et al. 2013; 
Dillard and Fisher 1990). Bonner et al. (2000) suggest that the most effective compensation 
schemes are quota schemes (combination of fixed pay and performance bonus) followed by piece-
rate schemes, tournament schemes, and fixed pay schemes. They suggest that the type of task 
performed is important for the effectiveness of these compensation schemes. Using activation 
theory and the findings from Bonner et al. (2000) on the effectiveness of piece-rate incentive 
schemes over fixed schemes, this study proposes that a piece-rate compensation scheme will be 
more effective in activating employees to perform better because employees operating under a 
piece-rate will try to increase their personal benefit. Thus, the following hypothesis is formally 
stated: 
H2: Employees will be more productive when they are operating under a piece-rate 
compensation scheme compared to when they are operating under a fixed pay 
compensation scheme. 
 Monetary incentive systems can be used to direct and control employees’ actions within an 
organization (Bonner and Sprinkle 2002; Libby and Lipe 1992; Pratt and Awasthi 1990). While 
directing and controlling employees’ actions may lead to increased employee effort, this does not 
guarantee improvement in employees’ judgment and decision-making in favor of the organization. 
Monetary incentives may be used to motivate employees increased effort, however the effect on 
performance depends on a cognitive characteristic that has been related to performance (Pratt and 
Awasthi 1990). This implies that the effectiveness of a monetary incentive may depend on the 
cognitive skill of the decision maker and the complexity of the task. Individual employees may be 
able to spend significant time on a problem solving task and pay undivided attention to the task, 
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but this may not result in improved performance if the employee does not possess the skills 
necessary to complete the task (Bonner and Sprinkle 2002). Thus, harder working employees do 
not guarantee performance improvements, especially if the employees are exerting more effort just 
to maximize their personal compensation without necessarily considering the goal of the 
organization.   
The responsibility of management is not merely to develop a value statement, but to  
develop a value statement that aligns with the organization’s overall objective and the objectives  
of other management control systems such as the incentives systems, and performance 
measurement systems (Birnberg and Snodgrass 1988; Bonner and Sprinkle 2002; Chenhall 2003; 
Malmi and Brown 2008). Mere exposure effect states that the mere repeated exposure of a stimulus 
object to an individual enhances the individual’s attitude toward that object (Zajonc 1968, 2001). 
Mere exposure leads to the formation of preferences and positive affect toward that particular 
object (Zajonc 1968, 2001). An interactive, electronically integrated value statement enhances the 
diffusion of the organization’s value statement through consistent reminders of the organization’s 
values to employees. Mere exposure effect suggests that this electronic delivery method will make 
the value statement more salient, accessible, and stimulating, which will promote positive affect 
towards the organization’s values and improve employees’ decisions. Additionally, activation 
theory suggests that employees operating under piece-rate incentive systems will be more likely 
to exert greater effort than employees operating under fixed pay incentive systems. The value 
statement will become more persuasive and influential when communicated interactively through 
electronic delivery as compared to the traditional passive delivery method. I propose that the 
delivery method will moderate the impact of the compensation scheme such that employees paid 
fixed pay with interactive delivery of a value statement will perform more like employees who 
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receive piece-rate compensation, but employees with fixed pay and passive delivery will perform 
worse.  This leads to the following hypothesis:  
H3: The method of delivery of an organizational value statement will moderate the 
impact of the compensation scheme such that employees operating under a fixed pay with 
interactive delivery will perform more like employees operating under piece-rate 
compensation, but employees with fixed pay and passive delivery will perform worse.  
Research Method 
Experimental Design and Task 
This study utilizes a 2x2 between-participants experimental design that manipulates the 
method of delivery of an organizational value statement and the type of incentive scheme. 
Specifically, the study manipulates the method of delivery of an organizational value statement as 
either interactive or passive. The study also manipulates incentive scheme by offering participants 
either a fixed pay incentive scheme or a piece-rate incentive scheme.  
The experiment is a computer-based study. Participants are required to complete the study 
in the university laboratory. They are all assigned to an individual computer and asked to work 
independently. The participants are provided a hypothetical case about a company and are required 
to perform a decoding task (Fischbacher 2007). The opening screen presents the explanation of 
research and the study overview. Individuals that agree to participate proceed to the next screen to 
begin the study. The second screen informs the participants that they will read important 
information in the next few screens and they are expected to pay maximum attention because they 
will be asked questions to assess their understanding of the material. The experimental material 
consists of six sections: background information about a hypothetical corporation (Ultra-mobile) 
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and the task instructions, explanation of compensation, comprehension checks, the decoding task, 
post-experimental questions, and demographics. See Figure 8 for a summary of the experimental 
procedures. 
Participants are presented with background information for a hypothetical scenario in 
which they are asked to assume the role of an employee of the company named Ultra-mobile. The 
employees are responsible for decoding as many letters as possible by identifying the number that 
correctly corresponds with the letter they are decoding. The company’s decoding system requires 
the employees to decode based on a predetermined decoding key. The participants are provided 
with the decoding key they are required to use on the left side of their screen. Participants earn one 
point for each letter correctly decoded. During each round, participants accumulate points as they 
complete the task, and the cumulative points are displayed on their screen. If participants make a 
decoding error, they receive an error message, but they have unlimited attempts to enter the correct 
number until they run out of time. Each participant has 60 seconds per round and the time 
remaining in any given rounds is shown in the upper right hand corner of the screen. All 
participants receive the same background information and instructions. See Figure 9 for the 
screenshot of the decoding task interface.   
After reading the background information and instructions, the participants move to the 
next screen, which describes the manipulation of the compensation scheme. Participants are 
required to correctly respond to comprehension check question before moving on to the decoding 
task. The comprehension check question ask the participants: which type of compensation are you 
eligible to receive? All participants performed two 60-second practice rounds to familiarize 
themselves with the decoding task before beginning the eight 60-second working rounds. After 
each working round, participants were able to see their results before moving on to the next round. 
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The participants then responded to decision-making questions and questions regarding 
demographic information.  
Independent Variables 
Compensation Scheme Manipulation 
The participants in the fixed salary incentive scheme condition are paid $10. The 
participants in the piece-rate incentive scheme condition receive $0.05 for each letter correctly 
decoded. Participants earned an average of $9.94 and received their remuneration in cash at the 
conclusion of the study. I asked the participants a force response comprehension check question 
about the type of compensation they are eligible to receive. Participants cannot proceed to the 
decoding task until they answer the question correctly.  
Value Statement Delivery Manipulation 
Before beginning the decoding task, all participants receive the following information: 
“…before completing your decoding task the CEO would like to remind you of Ultra-mobile’s 
corporate VALUE STATEMENT which emphasizes that: The work YOU do is an important part 
of the success of our company. Together we build systems that work!” In the condition with the 
interactive delivery of the value statement, participants are reminded of the corporate value 
statement after every two rounds; and, they must acknowledge that they have read and understand 
the information before proceeding to the next round of the decoding task. See figure 10 for the 
image of the interactive value statement delivery interface. Participants with passive value 
statement delivery do not receive any additional information while completing the eight rounds of 
the decoding task. 
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Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in this study is the participants’ performance on the decoding task. 
It is measured as the total number of points earned on the decoding task across the eight working 
rounds.  In the decoding task, participants have to use the key provided on the left side of the screen 
to correctly identify the number associated with the letter displayed on their screen. If the number 
is correctly recorded, they get a point. However, if the number is incorrectly recorded, they get an 
error message and they have unlimited attempts within the allocated time to respond correctly. The 
time that each participant has remaining in any given round is displayed in the upper right hand 
corner of the screen. The participants have 60 seconds for two practice rounds and 60 seconds to 
complete eight more rounds.  
Participants 
A total of seventy-seven undergraduate students participated in this study. The study was 
first announced via email to the students by their instructors, after which students voluntarily 
signed-up for the laboratory experiment using the sign-up link embedded in the email. In order to 
be eligible to participate in the study, participants are required to be eighteen years of age or above.      
Table 4 presents the demographic data of the participants. Forty-two of the participants are 
male (55 percent) and 35 are female (45 percent). Fifty-two of the participants are between 18–20 
years old (68 percent), while 23 are between 21–25 years old (30 percent) and two are 26–30 years 
old (3 percent). Fifty-one of the participants have 1-5 years of work experience (66 percent), while 
seven have 6-10 years of work experience (9 percent) and 19 participants have no work experience 
(25 percent). Thirty-two of the participants are accounting majors (42 percent) and 15 are finance 
majors (19 percent). Thirty-five of the participants are sophomores (45 percent), while 15 are 
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seniors (19 percent), 14 are juniors (18 percent), 11 are freshmen (14 percent), and two are graduate 
students (3 percent).  
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5 Panel A presents descriptive statistics related to the participants’ performance, 
which is represented by the total number of points earned in the eight working rounds across the 
six treatment conditions. In the fixed pay condition, the mean (standard deviation) for decoding 
task performance is 180.82 (20.12) when the value statement is delivered passively, and 196.90 
(28.63) when the value statement is delivered interactively. In the piece-rate incentive condition, 
the mean (standard deviation) for decoding task performance is 212.05 (26.60) when the value 
statement is delivered passively, and 201.84 (27.91) when the value statement is delivered 
interactively. The total decoding task performance mean (standard deviation) is 198.08 (28.38) for 
the passive delivery of value statement and 199.31 (28.02) for the interactive delivery of the value 
statement. The total decoding task performance mean (standard deviation) is 189.51 (26.05) and 
207.20 (27.37) for fixed pay and piece-rate incentives, respectively.    
Test of Hypotheses 
H1 posits that employees will perform better when there is an interactive delivery of the 
value statement compared to when there is a passive delivery of the value statement. The ANOVA, 
shown in Table 5 Panel B shows that the total decoding task performance mean (198.08) when 
value statement is passively delivered is not significantly different from the total decoding task 
performance mean (199.31) when the value statement is interactively delivered (F = 0.240, p= 
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0.313, one-tailed). The result implies that the main effect for the method of delivery of an 
organizational value statement is not significant, hence H1 is not supported.  
 H2 posits that employees will perform better when they are operating under a piece-rate 
incentive scheme compared to when they are operating under a fixed pay incentive scheme. As 
predicted, the result of Table 5 Panel B shows the main effect for incentive scheme is statistically 
significant (F = 9.093, p= 0.002, one-tailed). The result of this study supports activation theory 
(Gardner 1986). Hence, employees operating under a piece-rate incentive scheme perform 
significantly better than the employees operating under a fixed pay incentive scheme in the 
decoding task this might be because employees operating under a piece-rate are trying to increase 
their personal benefit. However, there is no personal incentive or pressure for employees operating 
under a fixed pay to increase their performance. 
H3 posits that the method of delivery of an organizational value statement will moderate 
the impact of the compensation scheme such that employees operating under a fixed pay with 
interactive delivery will perform more like employees operating under a piece-rate compensation, 
but employees with fixed pay and passive delivery will perform worse than any of the other three 
conditions. The result in Table 5 Panel B shows a significant interaction (F = 4.802, p = 0.016, 
one-tailed). Further analysis with a planned contrast of fixed pay with passive value statement 
delivery against the other three conditions also shows a statistically significant result (t= 3.159, p= 
0.001, one-tailed). Hence, employees operating under a fixed pay incentive scheme with passive 
delivery of an organizational value statement perform significantly worse than employees 
operating under a fixed pay incentive scheme with interactive delivery of an organizational value 
statement, as well as employees operating under a piece-rate incentive scheme. The implication of 
this result is that it is more beneficial for organizations paying their employees a fixed pay to 
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explore other informal control systems that can be used to encourage their employees to increase 
their performance. As predicted in this study, the interactive delivery of organization value 
statement significantly increases the performance of employees under a fixed pay incentive 
scheme. See Figure 11 for the graphical representation of the results. 
Additional Analysis 
 In order to assess whether any of the demographic variables covary with the result, I carry 
out additional analysis where all the demographic variables are included in the analysis. The results 
show that only gender is statistically significant, which implies that gender may likely influence 
the result of my study. Although there is no theoretical reason to expect gender to influence the 
performance of my participants in the decoding task, I run an ANCOVA in order to corroborate 
this assertion. Table 6 shows the ANCOVA with gender as a covariate. The interpretation of the 
results do not differ from the result of the ANOVA, which supports my assertion that there is no 
theoretical basis to expect gender to influence the performance of the participants in the decoding 
task. 
Conclusion 
Using a decoding task, I find that the effectiveness of a fixed pay incentive scheme depends 
on the interactive or passive delivery of an organizational value statement. When the value 
statement is delivered interactively, which gives participants the opportunity to see the value 
statement more often, participants under a fixed pay incentive scheme perform better on the 
decoding task than when the value statement is delivered passively. The implication of this finding 
is that organizations can use informal management control systems, such as an organizational 
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value statement, to improve employees’ performance, especially if they are operating under a fixed 
pay contract. Intermittent display of the value statement to employees operating under a fixed pay 
will promptly and proactively remind the employees of the priorities of the organization. Also, 
since the technology is readily available within organizations, it can be used to enhance the level 
of interaction that employees have with the value statement. The results of this study buttress our 
understanding of mere exposure theory, which states that mere repeated exposure of a stimulus 
object to an individual enhances the individual’s attitude towards that object (Zajonc 1968). This 
study establishes that with the use of technology, frequent presentation of an organizational value 
statement will consciously or subconsciously motivate employees’ and improve their performance 
when they are operating under a fixed pay incentive scheme. 
 Similar to the finding of Kachelmeier et al. (2015), the interactive delivery of an 
organizational value statement does not improve the performance of employees operating under a 
piece-rate incentive scheme. This result is expected because employees operating a piece-rate may 
see the incentive compensation as the main motivation and work toward maximizing their personal 
benefit. Hence, the introduction of an interactive value statement will more likely distract them 
from their original strategy, which may eventually slow down their performance. As predicted in 
the study, employees operating under a piece-rate incentive scheme perform significantly better 
than employees operating under a fixed pay incentive scheme. 
 The implication of this study is that organizations can enhance the dissemination of their 
value statement by electronically integrating it into the day to day activities of the employees 
especially if they are using fixed pay incentive scheme. Practically, organizations could require 
employees to login into their computer systems using one or two of the value propositions of the 
organization every month, in addition to their personal login password. This will help employees 
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familiarize themselves with the values of the organization. This study contributes to the managerial 
accounting literature by extending Kachelmeier et al. (2015) study on communicated values as 
informal controls. My study shows that it is not just about the presence or absence of the value 
statement, but it is also about the salience of the value statement, which can be enhanced by 
interactive delivery through electronic integration especially when fixed pay is used.   
 My results suggest several avenues for future research. First, I use a decoding task in this 
study. Future research can extend this study using a more subjective task. In practice, some of the 
tasks that employees perform are subjective in nature. This indicates that it may be difficult to 
extend the results of this study to employees carrying out subjective tasks. Second, this study uses 
student participants, which may limit the external validity of the findings and applicability to the 
real world environment. Hence, future research can extend this study using either a field 
experiment or a qualitative study. Third, the manipulation of interactive delivery may not be as 
salient to participants as the incentive scheme in an experiment conducted in a relatively short time 
span. Stronger manipulation in practice might have greater effect on employees’ performance. 
Notwithstanding its limitations, this study extends managerial accounting and accounting 
information systems literatures by showing how the interactive delivery of an organizational value 
statement can be integrated electronically to improve employees’ performance when a fixed pay 
compensation scheme is used. 
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STUDY THREE: THE EFFECTS OF THE INCENTIVE SYSTEMS AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE ON STRATEGY SURROGATION 
Introduction 
Strategic performance measurement systems (SPMS) are systems that organizations use to 
translate their strategy into tangible objectives and performance metrics for employees (Burney 
and Widener 2013). SPMS are useful as a means of breaking down the overall organizational 
strategy into parts that are easier for employees to understand (Kaplan and Norton 2002).4 
Monetary and human investments in SPMS have increased since the 1990s, and recent reports 
indicate that an average company with $1 billion sales spends over 25,000 person-days per year 
planning and measuring performance using such systems (Micheli and Manzoni, 2010). 
The ultimate goal of a SPMS is to encourage employees to engage in actions that are 
consistent with overall organizational strategic objectives (Kaplan and Norton, 1996). Recent 
management accounting research has shown that strategically linked firm-specific performance 
measures can be used to evaluate strategy on a timely basis and assess the potential causes of 
strategic failures (Campbell et al., 2015). However, strategy surrogation has been identified as one 
of the possible unintended consequences of the use of a SPMS (Choi et al. 2012, 2013). 
 Strategy surrogation occurs when managers focus on the measures in the SPMS on which 
they are compensated and completely or partially lose focus on the overall strategic objectives of 
the organization (Choi et al., 2012, 2013). For example, consider a firm pursuing a customer-
focused strategy and measuring customer satisfaction using a satisfaction survey score. Choi et al. 
(2013) argue “to the extent that those scores imperfectly measure customer satisfaction, managers’ 
                                                 
4 The most common type of SPMS used in practice is the Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan and Norton 1992, 1993).   
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strategy-related judgments and decisions may be flawed if they surrogated customer satisfaction 
with the survey scores” (p. 106). Prior research has also shown that tying pay to performance on 
particular measures and targets included in a SPMS increases strategy surrogation, and the effect 
is more pronounced when managers are compensated on a single measure of a strategic construct 
compared to when managers are compensated on multiple measures of a strategic construct or 
under a fixed pay scheme (Choi et al., 2012).  
 The purpose of the current study is to investigate the impact of an important aspect of 
organizational context, specifically organizational culture, and different types of compensation 
schemes on strategy surrogation. Organizational culture is defined as a set of dominant values, 
beliefs, and assumptions that govern how people behave in organizations (Henri 2006). According 
to the competing values model, organizational culture can be characterized as control-dominant 
that values stability and accountability or flexibility-dominant that values invention and innovation 
(Quinn and McGrath, 1985; Quinn, 1988; Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983). In the current study, I 
examine the impact of each of these cultural characterizations on strategy surrogation. 
Furthermore, I build on the prior work by Choi et al. (2012) by investigating whether the type of 
organizational culture, flexibility or control-dominant, exacerbates or mitigates the impact of 
compensation scheme on strategy surrogation.  
I base my predictions on the effect of compensation scheme and the moderating effect of 
organizational culture on strategy surrogation on inattentional blindness theory (Simons 2000). 
According to this theory, when individuals concentrate on a particular object or event, they often 
fail to notice other relevant and distinctive objects of interest that are located outside their field of 
focus.  While discounting irrelevant information improves strategic decision-making (Chugh and 
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Bazerman, 2007; Simons and Chabris, 1999), inattentional blindness is the discounting (or actually 
failing to even notice) of relevant information that is beyond one’s current focus.  
I hypothesize that individuals operating in a control-dominant organizational culture will 
exhibit more strategy surrogation than individuals operating in a flexibility-dominant 
organizational culture. In a control-dominant culture, there may be greater motivation for 
individuals to be blinded towards an overall strategic objective and less motivated to look beyond 
the performance metric, because what gets measured will receive the most attention (Burney and 
Widener, 2013). Additionally, I predict that when individuals are paid for performance, they are 
motivated to meet or exceed performance targets and have little or no incentive to look beyond 
these metrics. Thus, individuals paid for performance will exhibit more surrogation than those 
individuals paid a fixed wage. Finally, I predict that a flexibility-dominant culture will reduce 
strategy surrogation more under a fixed pay scheme than a pay-for-performance scheme compared 
to a control-dominant culture.  
My experimental study involves a 2 (culture: control-dominant vs flexibility-dominant) x 
2 (compensation scheme: fixed pay vs. pay-for-performance) between-subjects design. To 
examine these hypotheses, I conduct an online experiment using 80 Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk) workers as proxies for managers. The study consists of two parts. In the first part, the 
participants are asked to read a short case scenario and at the end of the case they are asked to 
make some decisions. In the second part, participants are asked several post-study questions and 
demographic questions. The participants are randomly assigned to four conditions. All participants 
are paid $2.50 for participating and additional research compensation up to a total of $9.00 
depending on their randomly assigned condition and their decisions.   
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The results suggest that the effect of organizational culture does not influence managers’ 
propensity to exhibit strategy surrogation. Specifically, managers operating in a control-dominant 
organizational culture do not exhibit more strategy surrogation than managers operating in a 
flexibility-dominant organizational culture. However, the results show that the type of 
compensation scheme strongly influences employees’ tendency to exhibit strategy surrogation. 
Specifically, the results indicate that employees compensated using a pay-for-performance 
compensation scheme have higher tendency to use the measures of SPMS as surrogate for strategy 
constructs more than the employees compensated using fixed pay. This result is in support of the 
theory of inattentional blindness. These results imply that employees operating under a pay-for-
performance will be less likely to notice relevant information that is beyond their current focus 
when making decisions compared to employees operating under fixed pay. Lastly, I do not find 
support for the interaction.  
This study contributes to research and practice in several ways. First, there has been limited 
research examining management control systems from the perspective of organizational culture 
(Dent, 1991; Henri, 2006). The organizational culture literature outside of accounting is broad and 
dynamic. Prior literature has shown that we know little about the way in which accounting is 
implicated in an organization’s culture (Dent, 1991); hence, there is a need for more accounting 
studies that explore the links between management control system design and organizational 
culture. Although Dent (1991) used a longitudinal field study to explore how new accounting 
practices were implicated in an emergent reconstruction of an organization’s culture, my study 
extends prior research by exploring whether organizational culture, specifically control-dominant 
and flexibility-dominant, influence strategy surrogation.  Unfortunately, the results do not indicate 
that organizational culture is a driving force.    
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Second, this study examines and shows that employees compensated under a pay-for-
performance scheme significantly surrogate more than employees compensated under a fixed pay 
scheme. The results of this study corroborate prior research findings in the managerial accounting 
on strategy surrogation. Specifically, my study confirms prior findings by Choi et al. (2012) that 
employees compensated on a single measure of a strategic construct with a pay-for-performance 
exacerbates more surrogation of the construct relative to employees that receive a fixed pay.  
Third, this study examines whether the type of organizational culture moderates the effect 
of incentive system (Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002; Brüggen and Moers, 2007; Burney and Widener, 
2013; Cianci et al., 2013) on strategy surrogation. Considering the mixed results of incentive 
effects on individual performance (Ashton, 1990; Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002; Libby and Lipe, 
1992; Pratt, 1990; Tuttle and Burton, 1999), there is a need for accounting researchers to shed light 
on the effect of incentives on employee judgment and decision-making in different organizational 
environments. This study contributes to the incentives literature by highlighting conditions under 
which incentive systems can be used to refocus employees’ attention. Choi et al (2012) contributes 
to the literature on SPMS by highlighting the tendency of managers to use strategically linked 
performance measures as surrogates for strategy. While their focus was on the effects of 
compensation on strategy surrogation, they suggest that future research could investigate other 
institutional factors that inhibit or exacerbate surrogation. Thus, this study addresses one of these 
important institutional factors. Specifically, the study shows that organizational culture does not 
moderate the effect of incentive system on strategy surrogation. 
The paper proceeds as follows: The next section discusses the background literature and 
hypotheses development. Section III discusses the experimental method and design. Lastly, section 
IV provides the results, and section V discusses the conclusion and opportunity for future research. 
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Background and Hypotheses Development 
Surrogation 
“The primary purpose of measurement is to communicate the state of other things. Figures 
produced as an output of measurement have no utility in themselves apart from their 
function to represent the state of other objects. Things or phenomena that are used to 
convey information about the state of something else are called surrogates.”(Ijiri, 1975, p. 
40) 
 
Surrogation often occurs because perfectly capturing the construct of interest is difficult in 
reality (Ijiri, 1975). For example, prior literature shows that accounting measurement only provides 
a surrogate or symbolic representation of the economic reality in an organization, while the 
decision makers are interested in the underlying reality (Bedford, 1968). Measurement is defined 
as a special language which signifies real-world phenomena by means of numbers and the relations 
among those numbers that are predetermined within the number system (Ijiri, 1975).  The purpose 
of measurement is not to just capture the figures, but “to represent a given relation(s) among 
objects by predetermined relation(s) among the numbers” (Bedford, 1968, p. 272). Hence, an 
individual may think that measurement is the end, and they fail to understand that it is just the 
means to an end, which may result in surrogation (Ijiri, 1975). 
Strategy Surrogation 
SPMS have been described as any system in which there is a link between financial and 
nonfinancial performance measures and strategy in order to align individual actions within an 
organization with the organization’s strategy (Webb, 2004). While aligning individual actions with 
organizational strategy is important, transparency in performance measurement systems has been 
identified as one of the keys to a functioning and effective SPMS (Kaplan and Norton, 1996). 
Managers ideally should be able to “see through” the metrics of measurement of a strategically 
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linked performance measurement systems (Kaplan and Norton, 1992), since a perfect measure of 
the construct of interest is rare (Choi, et al. 2012). When performance metrics are difficult to “see 
through” (Kaplan and Norton, 1993) and the performance goals are often difficult to achieve  
(Webb, 2004), SPMS utilization may result in strategy surrogation (Choi, et al. 2012, 2013). 
According to Choi et al. (2012), strategy surrogation occurs in SPMS when individuals in 
an organization “fail to fully appreciate the fact that measures are merely representations of 
strategic constructs, and act as though the measures are the constructs of interest” (p.1135). To 
completely capture a construct of interest in a SPMS is practically impossible. For example, 
university administration may try to capture the strategic construct of teaching effectiveness 
through student evaluations; however, since the faculty members are aware that their performance 
evaluation will depend on students’ perceptions, they may decide to give students higher grades 
towards the end of the semester in order to get a better evaluation. In this example, the faculty 
members have surrogated the students’ evaluations for teaching effectiveness. This study explores 
whether institutional factors such as organizational culture could be used to encourage or 
discourage managers from exhibiting such dysfunctional behavior. 
Limited studies have examined this important concept of strategy surrogation in 
accounting. Choi et al. (2012) examine whether and how the use of strategically linked 
performance measures for compensation purpose affects managers’ propensity to exhibit strategy 
surrogation. Drawing upon attribute substitution theory, their study shows that when managers’ 
compensation is based on a single measure of a strategic construct of interest, managers are more 
likely to surrogate than when the compensation is based on multiple measures of a strategic 
construct. Surrogation often occurs in a complex and fast paced decision-making environment in 
an organization, where managers often rely on an easily accessible heuristic for their judgment and 
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decision-making (Kahneman, 2011). Hence, managers have a tendency to attach more value to a 
singular measure of a strategic construct compared to multiple measures, especially when it is 
easier for them to focus on more salient items (Kahneman, 2011; Simons, 2000).  
In a similar manner, Choi et al. (2013) examine how managers’ involvement in strategy 
surrogation influences their propensity to surrogate strategic constructs with compensated 
measures. Their study suggests that in order to mitigate the impact of strategy surrogation in an 
organization, managers must be involved in choosing strategy measures. They demonstrate that 
managers’ involvement in strategy deliberation without involvement strategy selection may not 
necessarily reduce surrogation. Considering the importance of SPMS in an organization (Campbell 
et al., 2015; Chen, 2015; Chenhall, 2005; Dent, 1990) and the potential hindering effect of strategy 
surrogation on the effectiveness of SPMS (Choi et al., 2013), prior research has called for future 
research that will examine other institutional factors that could possibly inhibit or exacerbate 
strategy surrogation (Choi et al., 2012). 
Organizational Culture 
Organizational culture and management style appear to be interdependent throughout the 
lifecycle of a performance measurement system; and, this interdependency is dynamic in nature 
(Bititci et al. 2006). Management style needs to evolve as the lifecycle of the performance 
measurement system and organizational culture evolves (Bititci et al. 2006). For an organization 
to compete in a competitive, dynamic, and global environment, the organization must be willing 
to develop and implement performance measurement systems that lead to a participative and 
consultative management style and organizational culture. Such organizational culture must also 
support implementation and the operating effectiveness of performance measurement systems 
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(Bititci, et al. 2006). Bititci, et al. (2012) has called for future research to obtain a better 
understanding of management style and organizational culture that would facilitate the 
implementation of SPMS).    
 Performance measures play an important role in motivating employees to achieve 
organizational goals (Bititci et al., 2012; Ittner and Larcker, 1998); however, prior studies have 
shown that work-place environments influence the relationship between the effectiveness of 
performance measurements and employee outcomes (Cravens, Oliver, and Stewart, 2015). 
Considering the interplay between the organizational culture and effectiveness of performance 
measurements, certain performance measurements and management styles may be 
counterproductive to overall organizational goals in a particular organizational culture (Bititci, et 
al. 2012). The initial belief that organizations that are managed through measures perform better 
is now being challenged (Bititci, et al. 2006; Johnson and Broms, 2000). Johnson and Broms 
(2000) show that organizations should move beyond “managing by results” to “managing by 
means”. Thus, organizations should encourage systemic thinking by their employees rather than 
driving work with just financial targets (Johnson and Broms, 2000). The managing-by-means 
environment creates a flexible, enjoyable, and more productive working condition, while 
managing-by-results environment leads to a controlling work environment which may not 
necessarily lead to an increase in productivity (Johnson and Broms, 2000). One important 
institutional factor that could impact effectiveness of SPMS in an organization is the values and 
culture of the organization (Bititci, et al. 2006). 
 Henri (2006, 79) described organizational culture as “the shared values (what is important) 
that interact with an organization’s structures and control systems to produce behavioral norms 
(the way we do things around here)”. The view of organizational culture is broad in the 
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management and accounting literature; however, this study draws upon the competing values 
model of organizational culture (Henri, 2006; Quinn and McGrath, 1985) to examine strategy 
surrogation. Organizational culture is an important concept because it can either motivate or 
demotivate employees to achieve overall organizational goals (Bititci, et al. 2006; Bititci, et al. 
2012; Choi, et al. 2012, 2013). While management-by-results is a form of management control 
system which is synonymous with terms such as formality, rigidity, and conformity, it may not 
necessarily lead to an increase in productivity (Henri, 2006; Johnson and Broms, 2000). 
Management-by-means is an inspirational method of encouraging employees to realize 
extraordinary results in a sustainable way, which is synonymous with terms such as adaptability, 
spontaneity, and responsiveness (Henri, 2006; Johnson and Broms, 2000).    
 Quinn and McGrath (1985) develop the competing values model of organizational culture. 
The competing values model consists of four quadrants which represent four different 
organizational cultures and their embedded theories of effectiveness: rational, consensual, 
hierarchical, and developmental cultures. From these four quadrants, the flexibility/control axes 
and internal/external focus axes emerge. For the purpose of this study, the current focus will be on 
the flexibility and control axes because the goal of this study is to examine how the trade-offs 
between flexibility (which could improve invention and innovation) and control (which could 
improve stability and accountability) affect strategy surrogation (Quinn and McGrath, 1985). 
 From a practical perspective, neither absolute flexibility nor absolutely control exists in 
any organization (Henri, 2006). Establishing absolute flexibility in an organization leads to 
disorderliness, instability, and chaos. At the same time, establishing absolute control discourages 
novelty, inspiration, and creativity. In every organization, an element of flexibility and controlling 
values exist (Quinn, 1988). Hence, Henri (2006, p. 80) explicitly states that the “distinction 
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between cultural types associated with control and flexibility values is not a dichotomous split but 
instead the extremes of control/flexibility continuum”. This study, similar to Henri (2006), refers 
to control values organizations as organizations reflecting a control dominant culture and 
flexibility values organizations as organizations reflecting a flexibility dominant culture. For 
example, working in public accounting can be used to illustrate a control-dominant cultural 
environment where auditors must strictly follow the audit program when carrying out the audit 
process. In this type of environment, auditors can easily surrogate the audit program for a quality 
audit, not realizing that it is merely providing guidance; the audit program does not necessarily 
translate to audit quality because it is the minimum requirement. In a contrary example, managers 
working in an environment where there is no formality or rigidity will have a different perspective 
to the metrics of their performance measurements. The managers will tend to see that performance 
metrics are used to provide mere guidance, which implies that they provide means to the end but 
not the end itself. This type of cultural environment can be referred to as flexibility-dominant 
culture.  
 Psychology theory on attention capture has found that when individuals concentrate on 
another object, event, or thing, they often fail to notice salient, distinctive, and unexpected events 
around them, a phenomenon known as inattentional blindness (Simons, 2000). For example, a 
driver may fail to notice a pedestrian while trying to make a right turn at the red stop light because 
his/her focus is on the red light, or a person may fail to notice a friend in the cinema while trying 
to find an empty seat because he/she is not paying attention to anything in the cinema hall other 
than the empty seat (Simons and Chabris, 1999; Simons, 2000).  Traditional attention capture in 
psychology literature can be broadly divided into two categories, namely, implicit attentional 
capture and explicit attentional capture. Implicit attentional capture is a situation where an observer 
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is able to ignore something they expect but know to be irrelevant. However, explicit attentional 
capture, which is also known as inattentional blindness, is a situation where an observer fails to 
notice something that is potentially relevant, but that he/she does not expect (Simons, 2000).  
 Choi et al. (2012) define strategy surrogation as the inability of managers to realize that 
performance measures are merely representations of strategic constructs and assuming that these 
measures are the constructs of interest. Choi et al. (2012) suggest that future research should 
examine other institutional factors that could inhibit or exacerbate strategy surrogation. The type 
of cultural environment is one of those factors that could influence managers’ propensity to 
surrogate. In a cultural environment that is control-dominant, managers may find it difficult to 
consider salient and potentially relevant information when making decisions compared to 
managers that operate in a flexibility-dominant environment. Due to rigidity, formality, and 
conformity characteristics of a control dominant culture, managers may demonstrate a greater 
tendency to over focus on the performance measures and lose focus of underlying constructs of 
interest, which the performance measures are representing. Alternatively, considering the 
responsiveness, adaptability, and spontaneity characteristics of the flexibility dominant 
environment, managers may have more incentive to see beyond the performance measures; hence, 
they may be less likely to ignore salient and potentially relevant information than the managers in 
a control-dominant organizational culture. Using inattentional blindness theory, I propose the 
following hypothesis: 
H1: Managers operating within a control-dominant organizational culture will exhibit 
more strategy surrogation than managers operating within a flexibility-dominant 
organizational culture  
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Incentive Systems, Performance Measurement and Strategy Surrogation 
Incentive systems have been examined from different dimensions in the accounting 
literature. For example, reporting structures may be classified as vertical incentive systems where 
team members report observations of their peers’ efforts to management or a horizontal incentive 
system that allows team members to directly control the actions of each other. As the level of team 
identity increases, the horizontal approach becomes more effective relative to the vertical approach 
(Towry 2003). Measuring how employees react to incentives is very important to performance 
measurement and most importantly to SPMS (Burney and Widener, 2013; Chenhall, 2005).      
 Burney and Widener (2013) examine whether the extent to which a SPMS is coupled with 
strategy affects employee performance indirectly through motivational characteristics such as 
perceived self-efficacy and perceived psychological contract. Their study shows that tightly 
properly aligning a SPMS-based incentives plan with strategy facilitates internalized motivated 
behaviors (Burney and Widener, 2013). The ultimate goal of SPMS is to translate overall 
organizational strategy, which is intangible, into tangible objectives and measures, and to ensure 
that organizational outcomes are improved through a better and clearer communication of an 
organization’s strategy to its employees (Kaplan and Norton, 1996). To achieve this goal, 
employee incentive systems are often linked to the SPMS (Cianci et al., 2013).  
Incentive systems are used to draw attention to, motivate, direct and redirect employees’ 
performance in an organization in order to achieve an overall organizational goal (Baiman, 1990; 
Towry, 2003). Some argue that incentive systems improve performance; others argue that 
incentive systems reduce performance, and some argue the presence of incentive systems has no 
effect on performance (Bonner and Sprinkle 2002; Burney and Widener 2013; Cianci et al. 2013; 
Awasthi and Pratt 1990; Tuttle and Burton 1999; Wright and Anderson 1989).   
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The effect of incentives depends on the ability of the decision-maker and the difficulty of 
the job tasks, and not merely the type and size of the bonus offer (Libby and Lipe 1992). Cognitive 
evaluation theory suggests that incentives can decrease effort and task performance by focusing 
attention on the external rewards related to a task, which ultimately decreases intrinsic motivation 
(Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002; Deci, et al. 1981; Dillard and Fisher, 1990). Alternatively, the 
pressure-arousal-performance framework establishes that incentives, feedback, and justification 
generate pressures for decision-making  and can either lead to better or worse performance 
depending on other psychological factors (Ashton, 1990; Baumeister, 1984, 1986). Thus, 
generalizing the effects of incentive systems on performance measurement across different 
organizational environments is difficult (Pratt & Awasthi, 1990). As a result of this difficulty, more 
research that examines the relationship between different types of incentive systems and 
performance measurement in different organizational settings is needed (Bonner and Sprinkle, 
2002).     
Strategy surrogation occurs when incentive compensation increases the salience of the 
incentivized measures of performance (Choi et al., 2012; Ijiri, 1975). Specifically, Choi et al. 
(2012) investigate the influence of incentive compensation on managers’ propensity to use 
compensated measures as surrogates for strategic constructs. Their findings suggest that 
compensating managers based on a single measure of a strategic construct increases their 
propensity to use the compensated measure as a surrogate for the construct compared to 
compensating managers with multiple measures of a strategic construct. 
Employees’ exhibit an increase in productivity of approximately 20 percent when they are 
paid using a piece rate incentive system rather than a high fixed wage (Shearer 2004). The lowest 
weighted productivity scores occur when there is no incentive or only a creativity incentive 
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(Kachelmeier et al. 2008). Kachelmeier et al. (2008) suggest that the quantity of incentives will 
increase total quantity and creativity incentives will increase average creativity, however, 
combining the two may not necessarily increase productivity (Kachelmeier, Reichert, & 
Williamson, 2008).  
Pay-for-performance incentive compensation can be used to motivate additional cognitive 
effort, but that effort may not translate into optimum outcome for the organization (Libby and 
Lipe, 1992). Depending on the sensitivity of the cognitive process and outcome of the increased 
effort, increased pressure resulting from the pay-for-performance may cause counterproductive 
results (Ashton, 1990; Kennedy, 1995). Managers may decide to redirect their effort to optimize 
their personal incentives by not showing any initiative to see beyond the measures that have been 
linked to SPMS. It is practically impossible for an organization to accurately translate all its 
strategy into tangible objectives and performance metrics (Burney and Widener, 2013).   Hence, 
fixed pay compensation motivates managers to engage in actions that are consistent with overall 
organizational strategic objectives and provides managers autonomy to use their initiative in order 
to achieve strategic objectives. Additionally, fixed pay compensation can be used to build trust 
between the managers and the organization, because managers equate fixed pay with an increased 
level of trust, i.e., they are trusted to do their job without additional incentives that are associated 
with pay-for-performance. However, using pay-for-performance linked to SPMS can be perceived 
by managers as a way of enforcing the use of SPMS, which may reduce innovativeness and 
creativity of the managers.  
The type of incentive systems, fixed-pay or pay-for-performance, may affect managers’ 
propensity to exhibit strategy surrogation. Specifically, using psychology-based theory of 
inattentional blindness, managers that are compensated by fixed pay are expected to surrogate less 
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than managers that are compensated by a pay-for-performance scheme. Pay-for-performance may 
encourage managers to focus more on the measures of performance in an attempt to optimize their 
incentives. Hence, managers will concentrate on the metrics rather than looking beyond the 
metrics. However, when managers are compensated using fixed pay, they are expected to be more 
likely to rely on their intrinsic motivation to perform their job because there is little incentive for 
them to over focus on the metrics of performance measurements. This implies that the managers 
operating under a pay-for-performance scheme are expected to surrogate more than managers 
operating under a fixed-pay incentive compensation. Thus, the following is proposed: 
H2: Managers operating under pay-for-performance incentive compensation will exhibit 
more strategy surrogation than managers operating under fixed pay compensation.  
 Inattentional blindness suggests that employees will not notice salient and important events 
outside the scope of established performance measures while they are trying to focus their attention 
on performance measures (Simons and Chabris, 1999; Simons, 2000). Thus, when managers focus 
on a performance measure under a pay-for-performance incentive compensation and they do not 
see beyond performance measures, their propensity to exhibit strategy surrogation should be 
greater when the organization operates under a control-dominant culture compared to a flexibility-
dominant culture. This is expected because a control-dominant culture encourages conformity, 
formality, and rigidity while a flexibility-dominant culture encourages adaptability, spontaneity, 
and responsiveness. Additionally, pairing a pay-for-performance incentive compensation with a 
control-dominant organizational culture introduces another form of pressure on managers. This 
may make managers think that as long as they satisfy the pay-for-performance requirements they 
have no additional obligation to ensure that the overall organizational strategic objectives are met.   
94 
 
 Managers may exhibit strategy surrogation consciously or subconsciously. Managers could 
consciously surrogate because managers may not be interested in paying attention to anything 
other than their performance metrics. This implies that there is no incentive for managers to see 
beyond the metrics of performance measurement. However, managers could subconsciously 
surrogate as a result of excessive pressure resulting from the combination of a control-dominant 
culture and a pay-for-performance incentive compensation. A pay-for-performance incentive may 
motivate additional cognitive effort by the managers, but this may not necessarily translate into 
the outcome the organization expects. Similarly, pay-for-performance may encourage managers 
to be innovative, but the innovation may be more towards managers’ personal benefits rather than 
organizational strategic objectives. Hence, under a pay-for-performance incentive compensation, 
managers will be more likely to surrogate than when they are under a fixed pay incentive scheme, 
and a flexibility-dominant culture will be more likely to reduce the propensity to exhibit 
surrogation. Thus, the formal hypothesis is presented below:    
H3: A flexibility-dominant culture will reduce strategy surrogation more under a fixed pay 
scheme than under a pay-for-performance scheme compared to a control-dominant 
culture. 
Experimental Method and Design 
Experimental Design and Task  
This study utilizes a 2x2 between-participants experimental design that manipulates 
organizational culture and the type of compensation scheme. Specifically, the study manipulates 
the organizational culture by describing a scenario in which an organization has a control-dominant 
culture that values stability and accountability or a flexibility-dominant culture that values 
95 
 
invention and innovation. The study also manipulates incentive schemes by offering participants 
either fixed-pay or pay-for-performance compensation. The participants are provided a 
hypothetical case about the company and are required to make some decisions. Specifically, the 
study consists of two parts. In the first part, the participants are asked to read a short case scenario5 
and at the end of the case participants are asked to make some decisions. In the second part, 
participants are asked several post-study questions and several demographic questions.    
The experiment is an online based study administered via Qualtrics software and 
disseminated through MTurk.  The opening screen is the informed consent page which was 
approved by the IRB. If they agree to participate, then participants proceed to the transition screen 
which further asks them if they have properly read the information on the consent page. At this 
point, participants can decide to go back to read the consent page again or move to the next page; 
the screening page. The screening page asked participants about their age and the general payment 
instructions which were included in the informed consent page. The general payment screening 
question asked the participants about how much they are going to be paid for participating in the 
study. All participants are paid $2.50, as well as additional research compensation up to a total of 
$9 based on their compensation scheme and decisions. The participants are screened out, if they 
are less than eighteen years of age or they failed the screening question about the payment 
instructions. Following the screening page is the introduction and instructions page. On this page, 
the participants are asked to assume they are the General Manager of Sparky City’s Water 
Treatment Plant and in charge of making changes to the water treatment process to reduce cost for 
the coming year. Participants are informed of the conversion rate of their compensation and the 
                                                 
5 This instrument is adapted from Akinyele, Arnold, Demek and Tian 2017 working paper. I would like to thank 
Vicky Arnold, Kristina Demek and Yu Tian for allowing me to adapt this case scenario for this study.  
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instructions of how to receive their payment on this study. A comprehension check question about 
their specific incentive compensation scheme is asked before participants are able to proceed to 
the case scenario. The comprehension check question asked the participants “which type of 
additional research compensation are you eligible to receive? YOU MUST ANSWER THIS 
QUESTION CORRECTLY TO CONTINUE IN THE STUDY”. Half of participants are randomly 
assigned to the fixed pay compensation scheme, while the other half are randomly assigned to the 
pay-for-performance bonus which is 20% of the total cost savings to the plant. 
The case scenario highlights that the Water Treatment Plant is responsible for treating the 
water with chemicals to make it safe for use and consumption by the residents of Sparky City. A 
lower quality water supply may seriously affect the very old, very young, or health impaired 
individuals, although it is never possible to make the water 100% safe. Yet, it is still the 
responsibility of Water Treatment Plant to ensure that the water is safe for use. Sparky’s average 
number of microorganisms per billion gallons of water over the past three years is within the 
acceptable range. The Water Treatment Plant is planning to reduce operating costs and is 
considering changing the chemicals used to treat water. A consultant has provided nine different 
alternatives which are all within acceptable range quantitatively, but may have negative quality 
implications. As the General Manager, the participant must make a decision about which water 
treatment alternative to implement based on this scenario.   
Independent Variables 
Compensation Scheme  
In this study, I use an experimental currency called “Lira”. Lira is converted into U.S 
dollars at a rate of $1 for every 20,000 Lira, and participants are paid in cash at the end of the study 
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through their MTurk accounts. The amount participants earn depends on their randomly assigned 
compensation plan as well as their decision on the water treatment alternative to be implemented. 
The participants in the fixed salary condition are paid 100,000 Lira, which is converted to Dollars 
at the end of the experiment. The participants in the performance bonus condition are paid 20 
percent of the total cost savings to the plant.   
Organizational Culture 
Half of the participants are randomly assigned to the treatment condition with a control-
dominant organizational culture while the remaining half are randomly assigned to the treatment 
condition with a flexibility-dominant organizational culture. In the control-dominant 
organizational culture condition, participants are informed in the scenario that Sparky’s City 
Council is known to be controlling and rigid with their decisions related to cost saving. The City 
strives to maximize cost saving irrespective of the warning from the consultant, as long as the 
alternative decision is within acceptable range for standards of water quality. In the flexibility-
dominant organizational culture condition, participants are informed in the scenario that the Sparky 
City Council is known to be flexible and adaptable with their decisions related to cost savings. 
They strive to maximize cost saving, but also consider any warning from the consultant.   
Dependent Variable 
The main dependent variable in this study is the participants’ water treatment alternative 
to be implemented. The participant can decide between nine different water treatment alternatives 
with corresponding cost savings to the plant as well as the microorganisms per billion (percent 
decrease in water quality).  
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Participants 
To examine these hypotheses, I conduct an online experiment using eighty MTurk workers 
as proxies for managers. The participants are randomly assigned to four conditions. All participants 
in this study are paid $2.50 for participating in this study, as well as additional compensation up 
to a total of $9.00 depending on their randomly assigned condition and their decisions. The 
majority of the participants are male (65 percent). Most participants are between 31-40 years old 
(44 percent), with others age 21-30 (35 percent), age 41-50 (13 percent), and over age 50 (9 
percent). Most of the participants (46.3 percent) have a Bachelor’s degree, with 28.8 percent of the 
participants having high school or equivalent, 18.8 percent with Associate degree, 5 percent with 
Master’s degree, and 1.3 percent with Doctorate degree. Most of the participants (36 percent) have 
11-20 years of work experience, with 28 percent of participants having 6-10 years of work 
experience, 16 percent with 0-5 years of work experience, 15 percent with 21-30 years of work 
experiment, and 5 percent with over 30 years of work experience. Tables 7 presents detail 
demographic data.  
Results 
Manipulation and Comprehension Checks 
 Participants answered a comprehension check question before they began to read through 
the case scenario: which type of additional research compensation are you eligible to receive? 
Participants must answer this question correctly before they can proceed to the case scenario. The 
manipulation check is conducted later in the experiment to provide assurance that participants are 
aware of the facts that are vital to the successful operationalization of the variable. To verify the 
manipulation of the organizational culture, participants are asked to indicate the level of their 
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agreement/disagreement with the following statements: (1) Sparky City Council is known to be 
controlling and rigid with their decisions related to cost saving; (2) Sparky City Council focuses 
on making decisions that are within an acceptable range for standards of water quality, and 
considers only quantifiable metrics in their decisions making process; (3) Sparky City Council is 
known to be flexible and adaptable with their decision related to cost savings; (4) Sparky City 
Council focuses on making decisions that are within an acceptable range for standards of water 
quality, and consider quantifiable metrics and qualitative factors in their decision-making process. 
Statements 3 and 4 were reverse coded. See Table 8 for the descriptive statistics of the 
manipulation checks and the result of t-tests comparing the answers of those in the flexibility-
dominant culture to the control-dominant culture for each of the question. The results of the 
analysis show that the organizational culture is significant for all the manipulation checks, which 
indicates the strength of the manipulation checks.  
Descriptive Statistics 
The focus of this study is to examine managers’ propensity to exhibit strategy surrogation 
which is operationalized by the water treatment alternative the manager decides to implement. 
Table 9 Panel A presents descriptive statistics of the managers’ decisions and Figure 12 shows a 
graphical representation of the results. In the fixed pay condition, the mean (standard deviation) of 
water treatment decision is 4.85 (2.58) when employees are operating under a control-dominant 
organizational culture, and 4.26 (2.38) when employees are operating under a flexibility-dominant 
organizational culture. In the pay for performance incentive pay condition, the mean (standard 
deviation) of the alternative water treatment decision is 7.20 (2.26) when employees are operating 
under a control-dominant organizational culture, and 6.76 (2.41) when employees are operating 
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under a flexibility-dominant organizational culture. The mean (standard deviation) of the total 
fixed pay is 4.56 (2.47), while the mean (standard deviation) of the total pay for performance is 
6.98 (2.32). Similarly, the mean (standard deviation) of the total control-dominant culture is 6.03 
(2.68), while the mean (standard deviation) of the total flexibility dominant culture is 5.58 (2.68).  
Test of Hypotheses 
H1 posits that in a control-dominant organizational culture, managers may find it difficult 
to consider salient and potentially relevant information when making decisions compared to 
managers operating in a flexibility-dominant organizational culture. Specifically, managers 
operating in a control-dominant organizational culture will exhibit more strategy surrogation than 
managers operating in a flexibility-dominant organizational culture. To test this conclusion 
statistically, Table 9 Panel B reports overall ANOVA findings. The results indicate that there is 
not significant difference between managers operating in a control-dominant organizational 
culture and managers operating under a flexibility-dominant organizational culture (F = 5.246, p 
= 0.172, one-tailed).  
 H2 posits that managers that are compensated by a pay-for-performance scheme are 
expected to surrogate more than managers that are compensated by fixed pay scheme. Managers 
compensated with a pay-for-performance are more likely to concentrate on the metrics of the 
performance measurement rather than looking beyond the metrics because they are unintentionally 
blinded to anything other than the metrics. Table 9 Panel B shows that managers operating under 
a pay-for-performance incentive compensation statistically surrogate more than the managers 
operating under a fixed incentive compensation (F = 117.405, p < 0.001, one tailed). 
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 H3 posits that employees working in a flexibility-dominant culture will exhibit less strategy 
surrogation under a fixed pay than under a pay-for-performance scheme compared to employees 
working in a control-dominant culture. Inattentional blindness suggests that employees will not 
notice salient and important events outside the scope of established performance measures while 
they are trying to focus their attention on performance measures. I predict that flexibility-dominant 
culture will reduce propensity of employees to surrogate and it will reduce it more under a fixed 
pay than under a pay-for-performance compared to control-dominant culture. The results do not 
support the interaction hypothesis (F = 0.110, p = 0.445, one-tailed).  
Conclusion 
This study examines the effect of an important organizational context, specifically 
organizational culture, and different types of compensation schemes on strategy surrogation. 
Strategy surrogation occurs when managers focus on the measures in the SPMS on which they are 
compensated and completely or partially lose focus on the overall strategic objectives of the 
organization (Choi et al., 2012, 2013). According to the competing values model, organizational 
culture can be characterized as control-dominant that values stability and accountability or 
flexibility-dominant that values invention and innovation (Quinn and McGrath, 1985; Quinn, 
1988; Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983).  According to inattentional blindness theory, when individuals 
concentrate on a particular object or event, they are less likely to notice other relevant and 
distinctive objects of interest that are located outside their field of focus (Simons 2000). 
 I hypothesized the main effect that managers operating in a control-dominant 
organizational culture will exhibit more strategy surrogation that managers operating in a 
flexibility-dominant organizational culture. I do not find support for this hypothesis. One reason 
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for not finding support for this hypothesis could be associated with the saliency of the 
organizational culture manipulation. It could be that the participants were not able to internalize 
the different type of organizational culture. It is also possible that participants in my study may 
have focused more on the immediate impact of the payment scheme rather than the broader impact 
of the organization culture. The implications of not finding support for this hypothesis is that, we 
cannot conclude that the type of organizational culture impact managers’ propensity to exhibit 
strategy surrogation. Future research should examine the effect of organizational culture on 
strategy surrogation in other contexts to ensure that the manipulation of organizational culture was 
not overpowered by the short term effects of reward system used in my study. Future research 
should also examine other institutional factors that can influence employees’ propensity to exhibit 
strategy surrogation. Similarly, future research can also examine other important aspect of 
managerial accounting research that the type of organizational culture can impact. 
 Choi et al. 2012 demonstrate that basing compensation on a single measure of a strategic 
construct leads managers to use that measure as a surrogate for the strategic construct more under 
pay-for-performance pay than they would under fixed pay. Consistent with prior literature (Choi 
et al. 2012), this study shows that managers compensated using a pay-for-performance surrogate 
more than the managers that are compensated using a fixed pay. This result is supported by the 
theory of inattentional blindness. The result shows that employees operating under a pay-for-
performance will be less likely notice relevant information that is beyond their current focus when 
making decisions, as compared to employees operating under a fixed pay.  Strategy surrogation is 
an important but difficult to examine construct in managerial accounting (Choi, et al. 2012, 2013). 
Most of the previous studies have used laboratory experiments to examine strategy surrogation. 
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Future research can examine the concept of strategy surrogation using a different research 
approach such as field experiment or qualitative methods. 
 There is no support for the interaction effect of organizational culture and incentive scheme 
on strategy surrogation as predicted in H3. Future research could examine this research question 
using a more control research environment. Regardless of the limitation of this study, I believe this 
study contributes to our understanding of strategy surrogation in managerial accounting literature.   
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 This dissertation contains three studies examining informal MCS and different types of 
incentive compensation schemes on employees’ performance. Interaction between informal MCS 
and different types of incentive compensation schemes serves as the common underlying concepts 
examined in this dissertation. Informal MCS are important to organizations because they are 
expected to encourage innovation (Bisbe and Otley 2004) without necessarily penalizing or 
rewarding employees directly. Informal controls are implied by social pressures, such as feedback, 
and management communication, such as a value statement or the organizational culture, where 
no explicit enforcement measures exist (Berry et al. 2009; Kachelmeier, Thornock and Williamson 
2015). The first study examines whether the presence of a value statement (an informal MCS) can 
be used to motivate employees to perform important but uncompensated subsequent tasks. 
Additionally, study one seeks to examine the type of incentive scheme that will result in the highest 
subsequent uncompensated task performance in the presence of an organizational value statement. 
The second study extends the first study by examining whether the interactive method of delivery 
of a value statement (informal MCS) can be used in conjunction with an incentive scheme to 
improve employee’s performance. Lastly, the third study investigates the impact of an important 
aspect of organizational context, specifically organizational culture (informal MCS), and different 
types of incentive compensation schemes on strategy surrogation. The following paragraphs 
discuss the unique contributions of each of these studies from a theory and/or practice perspective. 
Study one examines whether the presence of a value statement (an informal MCS) can be 
used to motivate employees to perform important but uncompensated tasks. Additionally, this 
study examines the type of incentive scheme that will result in the highest subsequent 
uncompensated task performance in the presence of an organizational value statement. Using an 
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economic incentive contract to explicitly stimulate expected behavior from employees is  desirable 
but often difficult to achieve (Choi, Hecht, Tafkov and Towry 2016). Considering that incentive 
contracts cannot completely govern all the employees’ responsibilities (Christ, Emett, Summers 
and Wood 2012), this study investigates how employees will perform their important but 
uncompensated tasks, and the decisions employees will make when economic incentives are no 
longer available. The effect of extrinsic rewards, such as incentive systems, on intrinsic motivation, 
especially with respect to employees’ subsequent attitude toward, or their willingness to engage 
in, the assigned task in the absence of contingency-based extrinsic reward is unknown (Lepper and 
Greene 1978). 
Drawing upon goal regulation theory, study one shows that under a fixed pay 
compensation, the presence of a value statement improves the performance of employees 
compared to the absence of a value statement. Conversely, under a piece rate incentive 
compensation, the presence of a value statement negatively influences the performance of 
employees in important but uncompensated task. The results of this study are different from 
Kachelmeier et al. (2015) because their study specifically focus on quality improvement in their 
value statement which improves quality but reduces quantity output. The value statements in my 
study emphasizes that the work the employees do is an important part of the success of the 
company without focusing on either quality or quantity improvement. The result of negative 
influence of the value statement under piece-rate compensation could be attributed to nature of the 
value statement used in this study since the value statement does not specifically emphasis quality 
or quantity improvement. The implication of the results of my study is that organization should be 
careful when designing their value statements especially if they plan to use it as motivational 
statements for their employees.  
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As study one predicted, in the presence of an organizational value statement, participants 
operating under fixed pay compensation perform significantly better than participants operating 
under piece-rate compensation. The result supports the proposition that employees’ intrinsic 
motivation under piece-rate compensation is more likely to be crowded out by the incentive 
scheme. Similarly, participants under fixed pay compensation are more productive in the 
uncompensated task than under quota compensation. There is no significant difference between 
uncompensated subsequent task performance of employees operating under piece-rate and quota 
compensation. My results suggest several avenues for future research. First, I use a laboratory 
experiment for this study and it is difficult to disentangle the effect of fixed pay and bonus pay 
components of quota incentive compensation. Future research can examine this research question 
using a field experiment. Field experiments may help our understanding of the effect of quota 
incentive compensation on important but uncompensated tasks. Similarly, field experiments will 
address external validity issues with the organizational value statement. Second, I use student 
participants in my study.  Using actual employees in future research could make incentive 
compensation more salient.  
Study two directly extends study one, by examining whether the interactive method of 
delivery of a value statement (informal MCS) through electronic integration can be used in 
conjunction with an incentive scheme to improve employees’ performance. Prior research shows 
that effectiveness of incentive systems is influenced by the presence or absence of a nonbinding 
value statement in the organization. Drawing upon mere-exposure effect, I hypothesize that the 
interactive delivery of a value statement will motivate employees to be more productive than the 
passive delivery of a value statement. I also hypothesize that employees operating under a piece-
rate incentive scheme will be more productive than employees operating under a fixed pay 
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incentive scheme. Further, I propose that the delivery method of the value statement will moderate 
the effectiveness of the compensation scheme such that employees operating under a fixed pay 
with interactive delivery will perform more like employees operating under a piece-rate 
compensation. However, employees operating under a fixed pay with passive delivery will be less 
productive than employees in any of the other three conditions.  
The results of the study two show that the employees who experience the interactive 
delivery of a value statement do not perform significantly better than employees who experience 
the passive delivery of a value statement. However, employees who receive a piece-rate incentive 
perform significantly better than employees who receive a fixed pay incentive. As predicted, the 
method of delivery of an organizational value statement moderates the effectiveness of a fixed pay 
incentive scheme such that fixed pay employees with interactive delivery perform more like 
employees operating under piece-rate and employees operating under a fixed pay with passive 
value statement delivery perform worse than employees under any of the other three conditions. 
The implication of the results of this study is that organizations can enhance the dissemination of 
their value statement by electronically integrating it into the day to day activities of the employees 
especially if they are using fixed pay incentive scheme. Practically, organizations could require 
employees to login into their computer systems using one or two of the value propositions of the 
organization every month, in addition to their personal login password. This will help employees 
familiarize themselves with the values of the organization. Future research can extend this study 
using either a field experiment or a qualitative study. The manipulation of interactive delivery may 
not be salient to participants for an experiment conducted in a relatively short time span. Stronger 
manipulation in practice might have greater effect on employees’ performance.  
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Study three draws upon the theory of inattentional blindness (Simons 2000) to investigate 
whether different types of organizational culture, control dominant or flexibility dominant, impacts 
strategy surrogation. Strategy surrogation occurs when managers focus on the measures in the 
SPMS on which they are compensated and completely or partially lose focus on the overall 
strategic objectives of the organization (Choi, Hecht, & Tayler, 2012, 2013). In this third study, I 
examine the impact of each of these cultural characterizations on strategy surrogation. The results 
of the study show that surrogation is not significantly different between employees operating under 
a control-dominant culture and those operating under a flexibility-dominant culture. Similarly, the 
organizational culture does not moderate the relationship between incentive systems and strategy 
surrogation. One reason for not finding support for this hypothesis could be associated with the 
saliency of the organizational culture manipulation. It could be that the participants were not able 
to internalize the different type of organizational culture. It is also possible that participants in my 
study may have focused more on the immediate impact of the payment scheme rather than the 
broader impact of the organization culture. The implications of not finding support for this 
hypothesis is that, we cannot conclude that the type of organizational culture impact managers’ 
propensity to exhibit strategy surrogation. Future research should examine the effect of 
organizational culture on strategy surrogation in other contexts to ensure that the manipulation of 
organizational culture was not overpowered by the short term effects of reward system used in my 
study. Future research should also examine other institutional factors that can influence 
employees’ propensity to exhibit strategy surrogation. Similarly, future research can also examine 
other important aspect of managerial accounting research that the type of organizational culture 
can impact. The results of the study show that employees operating under a pay-for-performance 
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compensation scheme significantly surrogate more than employees operating under a fixed pay 
compensation scheme. 
 Collectively these studies contribute to management accounting research by examining 
how different types of informal MCS such as organizational value statement and organizational 
culture interact with incentive compensation scheme. Specifically, these three studies highlight 
how and when we can use informal MCS to improve employees’ performance as well as their 
decision making in the organization. Study one contributes to research and practice by highlighting 
situations where a pay-for-performance incentive scheme may result in unintended consequences 
(Lepper and Greene 1978). Study two contributes to the management control literature by 
demonstrating how utilizing technology can enhance the delivery of an organization’s value 
statement and ultimately improve employees’ performance. Study three contributes to the 
incentives and organizational culture literature as well as strategy surrogation research by 
examining institutional factors that may inhibit or exacerbate surrogation.   
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APPENDIX A: STUDY 1 FIGURES 
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Figure 1 Diagram of z-Tree Experimental Procedure 
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Figure 2 Diagram of Qualtrics Experimental Procedure 
 
 
Figure 3 Slider Task 
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Figure 4 Decoding Task 
 
 
Figure 5 H1 Result 
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Figure 6 H1 a, b, c Results 
 
 
Figure 7 H2, H3 and RQ 
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Table 1 Demographics 
(n= 130)
n      %
Age
18 – 20 39 30%
21 – 25 61 47%
26 – 30 12 9%
31 – 35 12 9%
36 and over 6 5%
Gender
Male 62 47.70%
Female 68 52.30%
Major
Accounting 113 86.90%
Accounting and Finance 4 3.10%
Accounting and Economics 2 1.50%
Business 1 0.80%
Economics 1 0.80%
Finance 5 3.80%
Marketing 2 1.50%
Accounting MSA/MBA 2 1.50%
Grade Level
Freshman 3 2.30%
Sophomore 4 3.10%
Junior 56 43.10%
Senior 44 33.80%
Graduate Students 23 17.10%
Years of Experience
None 18 14%
1 – 5 85 65%
6 – 10 17 13%
11 and over 9 7%
No Response 1 1%
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Table 2 Main Result - Uncompensated Subsequent Task Performance6  
 
 
Panel B: Results of ANOVA: Effect of an Organizational Value Statement on 
Uncompensated Task Performance (H1) 
Source Sum of Squares d.f. Mean Square F-Ratio p-value 
Value Statement 164.880 1 164.880 .562 ..228 
Incentive Pay 3366.237 2 1683.119 5.740 .002 
Value Statement * 
Incentive Pay 7012.454 2 3506.227 11.956 <.001 
Error 36362.877 124 293.249   
Total 1381867.000 130    
 
Panel C: Planned Contrast of Value Statement and No Value Statement on Different Types 
of Incentive Pay (H1a, b, c) 
 
Contrast 
Value of 
Contrast 
Std. 
Error t d.f. p-value 
Uncompensat
ed Task 
Performance 
(FPVSvs.FPNVS) 22.11 6.286 3.517 40.638 .001 
(PRVSvs.PRNVS) -12.73 5.128 -2.483 41.768 .009 
(QVSvs.QNVS) -2.60 3.325 -.783 39.957 .219 
                                                 
6 Uncompensated task performance represents the number of decoding task that the participants were able to 
correctly decode in the subsequent task. 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Mean (Standard Deviation) [Sample Size]
Incentive 
Pay Present Absent Total
117.71 95.6 107.66
-24.61 -16.9 -23.96
[24] [20] [44]
95.1 107.83 101.75
-15.57 -18.42 -18.1
[21] [23] [44]
92.85 95.45 94.21
-10.07 -11.48 -10.78
[20] [22] [42]
102.75 99.88 101.32
-21.39 -16.73 -19.18
[65] [65] [130]
Value Statement
Fixed Pay
Piece Rate
Quota
Total
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Table 3 H2, H3 and RQ 
Panel A: Result of ANOVA: Effect of Presence of Value Statement and Type of 
Incentive Pay on Uncompensated Task Performance 
Source of Variation Sum of Squares d.f. Mean Square F-Ratio p-value 
Type of Incentive Pay 8560.744 2 4280.372 12.816 <.001 
Error 20707.318 62 333.989   
Total 29268.062 64    
 
 
 
  
Panel B: Results of Contrast for H2, H3 and RQ 
Contrast Value of Contrast Std. Error t d.f. p-value 
H2: Fixed Pay vs. Piece Rate 22.61 6.065 3.729 39.376 .001 
H3: Quota vs. Piece Rate -2.25 4.076 -.551 34.435 .293 
RQ: Fixed Pay vs. Quota 24.86 5.506 4.515 31.623 <.001 
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APPENDIX C: STUDY 1 EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS 
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[SCREEN 1 – CONSENT] 
 
You are invited to participate in a research project conducted by Kazeem Akinyele, Ph.D. 
Candidate, and Dr. Vicky Arnold, Faculty Supervisor, at the University of Central Florida. 
Whether you take part is up to you. You will be asked to perform some tasks and answer questions 
that will take approximately 30 to 45 minutes of your time. The purpose of this research is to learn 
more about employees’ task performance as well as their judgment and decision-making processes.  
 
You will be provided with some background information about a hypothetical company and will 
be asked to perform tasks and respond to a few questions. Please remember that there are no right 
or wrong answers. However, you are expected to take the tasks seriously, make decisions to the 
best of your ability, and answer the questions to the best of your knowledge.   
 
Participants may receive cash compensation ranging from $0 to $21 depending on their incentive 
compensation plan and their task performance. A unique code will be provided at the end of the 
experiment and each participant will present this code for reimbursement of cash incentive 
compensation. 
 
Please note that participation in this study is completely voluntary and your responses will be 
anonymous. If you decide to participate, you have the right to withdraw your consent or 
discontinue participation at any time. There are no anticipated potential risks associated with this 
study. You must be 18 years of age or older to take part in this research study. 
 
If you have questions, concerns, or complaints regarding this project, you may contact: Kazeem 
Akinyele, Ph.D. Candidate, Dixon School of Accounting, College of Business Administration, 
(407) 823-1478 or by email at kazeem.akinyele@ucf.edu or Dr. Vicky Arnold, Faculty Supervisor, 
Dixon School of Accounting, College of Business Administration by email at 
vicky.arnold@ucf.edu. 
 
Since this research involves human participants, it has been reviewed and approved by the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of Central Florida. For information about the 
rights of people who take part in research, please contact: Institutional Review Board, University 
of Central Florida, Office of Research & Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501, 
Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by telephone at (407) 823-2901. 
 
By clicking ">>" you are indicating that you wish to participate in this study. 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
[SCREEN 2 – TRANSITION] 
 
 
On the next few screens you will be required to read important information about the study. 
Please pay attention because you will be asked questions to assess whether you have read the 
material.   
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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[SCREEN 3 – BACKGROUND AND INSTRUCTIONS] 
 
[Background] 
 
KS Upright Automation is a leading provider of industrial products, systems, and services related 
to Instrumentation, Measurement, Safety, Electrical, Automation, and Communication Systems. 
KS Upright is a privately owned automation and telecommunication provider with their main 
office located in a major United States city. KS Upright uses sliders as one of its automation 
calibration equipment. 
 
[Instructions] 
 
For this study, please assume you are one of the employees of KS Upright and you are responsible 
for adjusting the sliders between 0 and 100 with the use of your mouse. Sliders are an important 
automation equipment that must be successfully positioned at exactly 50 on each slider. The task 
will consist of a screen with 48 identical sliders which must be moved to 50 within 120 seconds. 
Your “point score” in the task will be the number of sliders positioned at exactly 50 at the end of 
the 120 seconds. Your “point score” for each round will show at the center top of the screen. The 
time that you have remaining in any given round will be shown in the upper right hand corner of 
your screen. 
 
You will be paid a $5 show-up fee at the end of the study. At the conclusion of the study, you may 
receive additional compensation for your participation. In the study, we will use an experimental 
currency called “Lira”. The Lira you earn will be converted into U.S dollars at a rate of $1 for 
every 20,000 Lira and you will be paid in cash at the end of the study. The amount of money you 
earn will depend on your compensation plan. Please follow the instructions.    
 
There are 3 phases to this study 
 
Phase I – You have two rounds of practice (unpaid exercises). You will complete two practice 
rounds in order to make sure you understand the task that you are expected to perform. 
 
Phase II – You have six rounds of paid exercises 
 
[Treatment 1: Fixed Salary and Value Statement] 
As an employee of KS Upright, your compensation is a fixed payment of 300,000 Lira for 
correctly positioning as many sliders as possible in the six rounds. The correct position for each 
sliders is 50. You should correctly position as many sliders as possible in each round. Your 300,000 
Lira will be converted to Dollars and you will be paid at the conclusion of the experiment. All 
participants in today’s session will also receive a fixed payment of 300,000 Lira. 
 
The work YOU do is an important part of the success of our company. Together 
we build systems that work! 
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[Treatment 2: Fixed Salary and No Value Statement] 
As an employee of KS Upright, your compensation is a fixed payment of 300,000 Lira for 
correctly positioning as many sliders as possible in the six rounds. The correct position for each 
sliders is 50. You should correctly position as many sliders as possible in each round. Your 300,000 
Lira will be converted to Dollars and you will be paid at the conclusion of the experiment. All 
participants in today’s session will also receive a fixed payment of 300,000 Lira. 
 
 
[Treatment 3: Performance Target and Value Statement] 
As an employee of KS Upright, your compensation will be based on the number of sliders you 
correctly position in the six rounds. You will receive a fixed payment of 180, 000 Lira plus a 
performance bonus of 1,300 Lira for every slider correctly positioned after the first 20 in 
each round. The correct position for each slider is 50. Thus, the more sliders you correctly position 
after the first 20 sliders in each round, the higher your bonus.  Your total Lira will be converted to 
Dollars and you will be paid at the conclusion of the experiment. All participants in today’s session 
will also receive a fixed payment of 180,000 Lira plus a performance bonus of 1,300 Lira for every 
slider after 20. 
 
The work YOU do is an important part of the success of our company. Together 
we build systems that work! 
 
 
[Treatment 4: Performance Target and No Value Statement] 
As an employee of KS Upright, your compensation will be based on the number of sliders you 
correctly position in the six rounds. You will receive a fixed payment of 180, 000 Lira plus a 
performance bonus of 1,300 Lira for every slider correctly positioned after the first 20 in 
each round. The correct position for each slider is 50. Thus, the more sliders you correctly position 
after the first 20 sliders in each round, the higher your bonus.  Your total Lira will be converted to 
Dollars and you will be paid at the conclusion of the experiment. All participants in today’s session 
will also receive a fixed payment of 180,000 Lira plus a performance bonus of 1,300 Lira for every 
slider after 20. 
 
 
[Treatment 5: Piece-Rate Incentive and Value Statement] 
As an employee of KS Upright, your compensation will be based on the number of sliders you 
correctly position in the six rounds. You will receive 1,500 Lira for each slider correctly 
positioned. The correct position for each slider is 50. Thus, the more sliders you correctly position, 
the higher your compensation. Your total Lira will be converted to Dollars and you will be paid at 
the conclusion of the experiment. All participants in today’s session will receive 1,500 Lira for 
each slider correctly positioned at 50. 
 
The work YOU do is an important part of the success of our company. Together 
we build systems that work! 
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[Treatment 6: Piece-Rate Incentive and No Value Statement] 
As an employee of KS Upright, your compensation will be based on the number of sliders you 
correctly position in the six rounds. You will receive 1,500 Lira for each slider correctly 
positioned. The correct position for each slider is 50. Thus, the more sliders you correctly position, 
the higher your compensation. Your total Lira will be converted to Dollars and you will be paid at 
the conclusion of the experiment. All participants in today’s session will receive 1,500 Lira for 
each slider correctly positioned at 50. 
 
Phase III: You have four rounds of unpaid exercises in order to complete your tasks. 
 
I have read and understood the information shown above. 
Yes 
No 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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[SCREEN 4 REMINDER] 
Your task will begin momentarily.  
 
Remember, there are 3 phases to this study 
 
Phase I – You have two rounds of practice (unpaid exercises) 
Phase II – You have six rounds of paid exercises 
Phase III - You have four rounds of unpaid exercises 
 
Each round includes 48 sliders and you will have 120 seconds for each round to position the 
sliders correctly at 50 with your mouse to earn your point score.  
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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SCREEN 5 PRACTICE ROUNDS 
 
 
 
  
  
   
(a) Initial position.                                                        (b) Positioned at 50. 
Schematic representation of a slider. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
You have completed the practice rounds. The paid tasks will begin momentarily 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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SCREEN 6 Please start: Phase II - Paid Tasks 
 
 
 
 
  
  
   
(a) Initial position.                                                        (b) Positioned at 50. 
Schematic representation of a slider. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
You have now completed the paid tasks.  Your total point score was _______ and based on 
your_ _____ compensation plan, your total compensation is _________  
 
The unpaid tasks will begin momentarily 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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SCREEN 7  
Please start: Phase III - Unpaid Tasks 
 
 
 
 
  
  
   
(a) Initial position.                                                        (b) Positioned at 50. 
Schematic representation of a slider. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Thank you, you have now completed all the tasks for this study.  Please proceed to the next 
screen to answer some questions and provide demographic information. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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SCREEN 8  
[Manipulation Check Questions] 
 
Prior to positioning the sliders, you were given information about compensation you were 
eligible to receive for completing the task. Which type of compensation were you eligible to 
receive? 
1. A fixed salary of 300,000 Lira 
2. A fixed salary of 180,000 Lira PLUS a performance bonus that of 1,300 Lira for every slider 
correctly position at 50 after the first 20 sliders in each round.  
3. A piece-rate payment of 1,500 Lira for each slider correctly position at 50.  
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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SCREEN 9  
[Decision-Making Questions] 
 
Considering your compensation plan, what is the level of effort that you put in the phase three 
(unpaid slider tasks compared to the paid tasks)? 
 
1. Very low level of effort 
2. Low level of effort 
3. Slightly low level of effort 
4. Same level of effort 
5. Slightly high level of effort 
6. High level of effort 
7. Very high level of effort 
 
What is the expected level of effort that should be exerted on the phase three (unpaid slider tasks 
compared to the paid tasks)? 
 
1. Very low level of effort 
2. Low level of effort 
3. Slightly low level of effort 
4. Same level of effort 
5. Slightly high level of effort 
6. High level of effort 
7. Very high level of effort 
 
What is the level of performance that you would expect in the phase three (unpaid slider tasks 
compared to the paid tasks)? 
 
1. Very low level of performance 
2. Low level of performance 
3. Slightly low level of performance 
4. Same level of performance 
5. Slightly high level of performance 
6. High level of performance 
7. Very high level of performance 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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SCREEN 10 
[Demographic Questions] 
 
Please answer the following questions about yourself. 
 
What is your age?  
 
 
 
What is your gender? 
 Male  
 Female 
 
What is your major? 
 
 
What grade level are you? 
 Freshman  
 Sophomore 
 Junior 
 Senior 
Graduate student 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please make any comments that you think would be helpful in understanding your responses. 
 
 
 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
[Conclusion] 
You have completed this study. We appreciate your time and thank you for your participation! 
 
Please proceed to the next screen to exit this study and receive your validation code for payment. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
0000 
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Figure 8 Diagram of Experimental Procedure 
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Figure 9 Screenshot of Decoding Task Interface 
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Figure 10 Interactive Value Statement Delivery 
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Figure 11 Graphical Representation of the Results 
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Table 4 Demographics 
(n= 77) 
        n       % 
Age 
18 – 20      52    68% 
21 – 25      23    30% 
26 – 30        2      3%  
 
Gender 
 Male       42     55% 
 Female      35     45% 
 
Major 
 Accounting      32     42% 
 Finance          15     19% 
 Marketing        6       8% 
 Integrated Business       6       8% 
 Others       18      23% 
    
  
Grade Level 
 Freshman       11      14% 
 Sophomore       35      45% 
 Junior        14      18%  
 Senior        15      19%  
 Graduate Students        2        3% 
 
Years of Experience 
 None       19       25% 
 1 – 5       51       66% 
 6 – 10         7         9% 
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Table 5 Main Result - Performance 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics – Mean (Standard Deviation) [Sample Size] 
 Value Statement  
Incentive Pay Passive Interactive Total 
Fixed Pay 180.82 
(20.12) 
[17] 
196.90 
(28.63) 
[20] 
189.51 
(26.05) 
[37] 
Piece Rate 212.05 
(26.60) 
[21] 
201.84 
(27.91) 
[19] 
207.20 
(27.37) 
[40] 
Total 198.08 
(28.38) 
[38] 
199.31 
(28.02) 
[39] 
198.701 
(28.02) 
[77] 
 
 
Panel B: Results of ANOVA: Effect of Method of Delivery of Organizational Value 
Statement on Task Performance (H1) 
 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares d.f. 
Mean 
Square F-Ratio p-value 
Value Statement 
Delivery 164.861 1 164.861 .240 .626 
Incentive Pay 6256.123 1 6256.123 9.093 .004 
Value Statement 
Delivery x Incentive 
Pay 
3303.817 1 3303.817 4.802 .032 
Error 50225.749 73 688.024   
Total 3099782.000 77    
 
 
 
Panel C: Planned Contrast of Incentive Pay and Method of Delivery of Value Statement 
 
  Contrast 
Value of 
Contrast Std. Error t d.f. P-value 
Task 
Performance 
FPP vs. FPI, PRP, 
PRI 68.319 21.6246 3.159 73 .002 
 
 
  
146 
 
Table 6 ANCOVA with gender as covariate 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable:       
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 14434.885a 4 3608.721 5.746 <.001 
Intercept 391418.600 1 391418.600 623.261 <.001 
Incentive Pay 6223.853 1 6223.853 9.910 .002 
Value Statement 
Delivery 319.450 1 319.450 .509 .478 
Incentive Pay X 
Value Statement 
Delivery 
4352.110 1 4352.110 6.930 .010 
Gender 5008.504 1 5008.504 7.975 .006 
Error 45217.245 72 628.017     
Total 3099782.000 77       
Corrected Total 59652.130 76       
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SCREEN 1 – CONSENT 
You are invited to participate in a research project conducted by Kazeem Akinyele, Ph.D. 
Candidate, and Dr. Vicky Arnold, Faculty Supervisor, at the University of Central Florida. You 
will be asked to perform some tasks and answer questions that will take about 30 minutes of your 
time. The purpose of this research is to learn more about employees’ task performance as well as 
their judgment and decision-making processes. This study is funded by the principal investigator.  
 
You will be provided with some background information about a hypothetical company and will 
be asked to perform a simple computer-based decoding task, respond to questions checking for 
your understanding of instructions and a few demographic questions. Please remember that there 
are no right or wrong answers, and this will not affect your status or your grade in class. However, 
you are expected to take the tasks seriously, make decisions to the best of your ability, and answer 
the questions to the best of your knowledge. Participants will be randomly assigned to different 
incentive structures.  
 
Please note that participation in this study is completely voluntary and your responses will be 
anonymous. If you decide to participate, you have the right to withdraw your consent or 
discontinue participation at any time. There are no anticipated potential risks associated with this 
study. You must be 18 years of age or older to take part in this research study. 
 
If you have questions, concerns, or complaints regarding this project, you may contact: Kazeem 
Akinyele, Ph.D. Candidate, Dixon School of Accounting, College of Business Administration, 
(407) 823-1478 or by email at kazeem.akinyele@ucf.edu or Dr. Vicky Arnold, Faculty Supervisor, 
Dixon School of Accounting, College of Business Administration by email at 
vicky.arnold@ucf.edu. 
 
Since this research involves human participants, it has been reviewed and approved by the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of Central Florida. For information about the 
rights of people who take part in research, please contact: Institutional Review Board, University 
of Central Florida, Office of Research & Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501, 
Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by telephone at (407) 823-2901. 
 
By clicking ">>" you are indicating that you wish to participate in this study. 
 
 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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SCREEN 2 – TRANSITION 
On the next few screens you will read important information about the study. Please pay 
attention because you will be asked questions to assess your understanding of the 
material.   
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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SCREEN 3 – BACKGROUND AND INSTRUCTIONS 
[Background] 
 
Ultra-mobile is a leading developer of internet communication systems. They are valued by 
employees as one of the top 10 best companies for which to work. The development of these 
internet communication systems requires employees to complete decoding tasks.  
 
[Instructions] 
 
Please assume you are one of the employees of Ultra-mobile. The company’s decoding system 
requires you to decode based on a predetermined decoding key. You are responsible for decoding 
as many letters as possible by identifying the number that correctly corresponds with the letter you 
are decoding.  In this study, you will be provided the decoding key you are required to use, and it 
will be on the left side of your screen. If the number is correctly recorded, you will earn a point. 
These points will accumulate as you complete the task, and the cumulative points will be displayed 
on your screen. If the number is incorrectly recorded, you will receive an error message. However, 
you will have unlimited attempts to enter the correct number. 
 
Each decoding task is timed. You will be asked to complete two practice rounds, followed by eight 
working rounds. You have 60 seconds for each practice round and 60 seconds for each working 
round. A timer will display in the upper right hand corner of your screen showing the time you 
have remaining for that round. 
 
All participants will receive cash compensation for their participation in this study.  You will be 
provided more information about how your cash compensation is calculated in the next screen.  
 
Please proceed to the next screen to learn more about your decoding task and compensation 
plan in this study. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
I have read and understand the information shown above. 
Yes 
No 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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SCREEN 4 INCENTIVE AND VALUE STATEMENT DELIVERY MANIPULATIONS 
[Treatment 1: Fixed Salary and Passive Value Statement] 
 
Decoding Task  
As a reminder, you will complete two practice rounds to make sure you understand the decoding 
task that you are expected to perform. Following the practice rounds, you have eight working 
rounds of the decoding task for which you will be compensated. 
 
Payment Information 
Your compensation for the work periods will be a fixed payment of $10 for correctly decoding as 
many letters as possible in the eight working rounds. You will receive this remuneration at the 
conclusion of the study. 
 
Before completing your decoding task, the CEO would like to remind you of Ultra-mobile‘s 
corporate VALUE STATEMENT which emphasizes that:  
 
“The work YOU do is an important part of the success of our company. Together 
we build systems that work!”(This will be presented once at the beginning of the 
task.) 
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[Treatment 2: Fixed Salary and Interactive Value Statement] 
 
Decoding Task  
As a reminder, you will complete two practice rounds to make sure you understand the decoding 
task that you are expected to perform. Following the practice rounds, you have eight working 
rounds of the decoding task for which you will be compensated. 
 
Payment Information 
Your compensation for the work periods will be a fixed payment of $10 for correctly decoding as 
many letters as possible in the eight working rounds. You will receive this remuneration at the 
conclusion of the study. 
 
Before completing your decoding task, the CEO would like to remind you of Ultra-mobile‘s 
corporate VALUE STATEMENT which emphasizes that:  
 
“The work YOU do is an important part of the success of our company. Together 
we build systems that work!” (This will be presented 9 times, at the beginning of 
each round of decoding task.) 
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[Treatment 3: Piece-Rate Incentive and Passive Value Statement] 
Decoding Task  
As a reminder, you will complete two practice rounds to make sure you understand the decoding 
task that you are expected to perform. Following the practice rounds, you have eight working 
rounds of the decoding task for which you will be compensated. 
 
Payment Information 
Your compensation will be based on the number of letters you correctly decode in the eight 
working rounds. You will receive $0.05 for each letter correctly decoded. Thus, the more letters 
you correctly decode, the more compensation you will receive.  
 
Before completing your decoding task, the CEO would like to remind you of Ultra-mobile‘s 
corporate VALUE STATEMENT which emphasizes that:  
 
“The work YOU do is an important part of the success of our company. Together 
we build systems that work!”(This will be presented once at the beginning of the 
task.) 
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[Treatment 4: Piece-Rate Incentive and Interactive Value Statement] 
 
Decoding Task  
As a reminder, you will complete two practice rounds to make sure you understand the decoding 
task that you are expected to perform. Following the practice rounds, you have eight working 
rounds of the decoding task for which you will be compensated. 
 
Payment Information 
Your compensation will be based on the number of letters you correctly decode in the eight 
working rounds. You will receive $0.05 for each letter correctly decoded. Thus, the more letters 
you correctly decode, the more compensation you will receive.  
 
Before completing your decoding task, the CEO would like to remind you of Ultra-mobile‘s 
corporate VALUE STATEMENT which emphasizes that:  
 
“The work YOU do is an important part of the success of our company. Together 
we build systems that work!”(This will be presented 9 times, at the beginning of each 
round of decoding task.) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
I have read and understand the information shown above. 
Yes 
No 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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SCREEN 5 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Comprehension Checks 
 
Which type of compensation are you eligible to receive? 
A fixed salary of $10 
A piece-rate payment of $0.05 for each alphabet correctly decoded 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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SCREEN 6 
 
Two Practice Rounds 
 
Instructions: In the box provided, enter the number that corresponds with the letter 
displayed in the middle of your screen. Use the decoding key on the left to identify the 
appropriate number. You have 60 seconds for each practice round. 
 
It is very important that you work as quickly and accurately as possible during this practice 
period so that you have a good idea of how well you can perform this task. 
 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
You have completed the practice rounds.  
 
Your total points are ______ 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please proceed to the next screen to start your eight rounds of 60 seconds decoding tasks 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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SCREEN 7  
 
Please start: Decoding Task Eight Rounds 
 
 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Thank you! You have now completed all the tasks for this study.   
 
Please proceed to the next screen to exit this task and open the link on your desktop to 
answer few questions and provide demographic information. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
You have now completed the decoding task paid rounds.  
 
Your total point points are _______  
Based on your __________ compensation plan, your total compensation is $_________.  
 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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SCREEN 8 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 [Qualtrics Link] 
Please input your “lab” number which was provided to you at the beginning of this 
experiment in order to complete the following questions and receive your cash 
compensation at the end of the experiment. 
  
159 
 
SCREEN 9 
[Manipulation Check Questions] 
 
To what extent do you think Ultra-mobile VALUE STATEMENT influenced your performance 
in decoding task? 
 
1. Not at all influence 
2. Slightly influence 
3. Somewhat influence 
4. Moderately influence 
5. Extremely influence 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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SCREEN 10 
[Decision-Making Questions] 
 
To what extent do you think the organization values your performance? 
 
1. Not at all value 
2. Slightly value 
3. Somewhat value 
4. Moderately value 
5. Extremely value 
 
To what extent do you think the incentive compensation influenced your performance in the 
decoding task? 
 
1. Not at all influence 
2. Slightly influence 
3. Somewhat influence  
4. Moderately influence 
5. Extremely influence 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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SCREEN 11 
[Demographic Questions] 
 
Please answer the following questions about yourself. 
 
What is your age?  
 
 
 
What is your gender? 
 Male  
 Female 
 
What is your major? 
 
 
What year are you in college? 
 Freshman  
 Sophomore 
 Junior 
 Senior 
Graduate student 
 
How many years of overall work experience do you have? 
 
 
 
 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please make any comments that you think would be helpful in understanding your responses. 
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SCREEN 12 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
[Conclusion] 
You have completed this study. We appreciate your time and thank you for your participation! 
 
Please proceed to the next screen to exit this study. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Figure 12 H3 Actual Interaction Result 
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Table 7 Demographics 
   n   % 
Age      
 21 - 30  28  35 
 31 - 40  35  44 
 41 - 50  10  13 
 51 - 60  7  9 
Gender      
 Male  52  65 
 Female  28  35 
Education      
 Less than high school  0  - 
 
High school or 
equivalent  23  28.8 
 Associate degree  15  18.8 
 Bachelor’s degree  37  46.3 
 Master’s degree  4  5.0 
 Doctorate degree  1  1.3 
Work Experience           
  0 - 5   13   16 
  6 – 10   22   28 
  11- 20   29   36 
  21 - 30   12   15 
  > 30   4   5 
 Years of 
current job experience           
  0 - 5   53   66 
  6 – 10   19   24 
  11 - 20   8   10 
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Table 7 continued 
Public Sector Work 
Experience           
  Yes   21   26.3 
  No   59   73.8 
Years of Public Sector 
Work Experience           
  None   60   75 
  1 – 5   10   13 
  6 - 10   9   11 
  >10   1   1 
Annual Household 
Income           
  Less than $20,000   6   7.5 
  $20,000 - $40,000   26   32.5 
  $41,000 - $70,000   34   42.5 
  $71,000 - $100,000   7   8.8 
  Prefer not to answer   7   8.8 
Political View           
  More Liberal   58   72.5 
  More Conservative   22   27.5 
Ethnic           
  African   0  0 
  African/American   5  6.3 
  Asian   7  8.8 
  
Caucasian/White (non-
Hispanic)   57  71.3 
  Hispanic   9  11.3 
  Middle Eastern/Arabic   1  1.3 
  Multi-Racial   1  1.3 
  Native American   0  0 
  Other/Please specify   0  0 
  Prefer not to answer   0  0 
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Table 8 Organizational Culture Manipulations Descriptive Statistics and Test of Differences 
Descriptions Organizational 
Culture 
Mean 
(SD) 
[n] 
t Sig. (2 tailed) 
Sparky City Council is known to be 
controlling and rigid with their decisions 
related to cost saving 
Control-
dominant 
6.35 
(1.292) 
[40] 
10.366 <.001 
Flexibility-
dominant 
2.58 
(1.907) 
[40] 
Sparky City Council focuses on making 
decisions that are within an acceptable 
range for standards of water quality, and 
considers only quantifiable metrics in 
their decisions making process 
Control-
dominant 
5.70 
(1.728) 
[40] 
2.647 .010 
Flexibility-
dominant 
4.65 
(1.819) 
[40] 
Sparky City Council is known to be 
flexible and adaptable with their decision 
related to cost savings (Reverse coded) 
Control-
dominant 
5.88 
(1.636) 
[40] 
10.796 <.001 
Flexibility-
dominant 
2.20 
(1.400) 
[40] 
Sparky City Council focuses on making 
decisions that are within an acceptable 
range for standards of water quality, and 
considers quantifiable metrics and 
qualitative factors in their decision-
making process  (Reverse coded) 
Control-
dominant 
4.10 
(2.122) 
[40] 
5.648 <.001 
Flexibility-
dominant 
2.03 
(.947) 
[40] 
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Table 9 Main Results –Alternative Decisions 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics – Mean (Standard Deviation) [Sample Size] 
 Organizational Culture  
Incentive Pay Control-
dominant 
Flexibility-
dominant 
Total 
Fixed Pay 4.85 
(2.58) 
[20] 
4.26 
(2.38) 
[19] 
4.56 
(2.47) 
[39] 
Pay for 
Performance 
7.20 
(2.26) 
[20] 
6.76 
(2.41) 
[21] 
6.98 
(2.32) 
[41] 
Total 6.03 
(2.68) 
[40] 
5.58 
(2.68) 
[40] 
5.80 
(2.67) 
[80] 
 
 
Panel B: Results of ANOVA: Effects of Organizational Culture and Incentive Payment 
on Strategy Surrogation 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares d.f. 
Mean 
Square F-Ratio p-value 
Incentive Pay 117.405 1 117.405 20.222 <.001 
Organizational Culture 5.246 1 5.246 .904 .172 
Incentive Pay x 
Organizational Culture .110 1 .110 .019 .445 
Error 441.244 76 5.806   
Total 3254.000 80    
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
[Transition Screen] 
Please ensure you have read the information on the previous screen very carefully. You will be 
asked a question regarding the information provided, and you must respond correctly in order to 
participate in this study.  
If you would like to review the previous information before continuing, click the “No, please go 
back to the previous screen” button.  
If you would like to continue with the study click the “Yes, please proceed to the next screen” 
button. Once you proceed you will not be able to go back. 
 
Yes, please proceed to the next screen 
No, please go back to the previous screen 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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[Screening Questions] 
 
What is your age? 
 
 
How much are you going to be paid for participating in this study? 
1) All participants will be paid $2.50 only for participating. 
2) All participants will be paid $2.50, as well as additional research compensation up to a 
total of $9.00 for completing this study.   
3) I have no idea. 
On the next few screens you will be required to read important information about the 
study. Please pay attention because you will be asked questions to assess whether you have 
read the material.   
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 [Introduction & Instructions – Treatment 1] 
 
 
Dear Participant, 
   
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CLOSELY AS IT EXPLAINS HOW 
YOU WILL BE COMPENSATED FOR THE ADDITIONAL RESEARCH COMPENSATION. 
ALL PARTICIPANTS WILL RECEIVE $2.50 IN ADDITION TO THE MONEY EARNED 
BASED ON THE COMPENSATION PLAN EXPLAINED BELOW. 
 
In this study, we will use an experimental currency called “Lira”.  
 
Please assume you are the General Manager of Sparky City's Water Treatment Plant and you are 
in charge of making changes to the water treatment process to reduce costs for the coming year.  
 
As General Manager, your compensation for the coming year is a fixed salary of 100,000 
Lira.  
  
The Lira you earn as General Manager will be converted into U.S. dollars at a rate of $1 for 
every 20,000 Lira earned and you will receive instructions on how to receive payment on the last 
screen of this study. Please follow the instructions carefully. 
 
Please proceed to the following screen where you will learn about your role as General Manager 
of Sparky City's Water Treatment Plant and propose changes to the water treatment for the 
coming year. 
 
 
I have read and understood the information shown above. 
Yes 
No 
 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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[Introduction & Instructions – Treatment 2] 
 
Dear Participant, 
  
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CLOSELY AS IT EXPLAINS HOW 
YOU WILL BE COMPENSATED FOR THE ADDITIONAL RESEARCH COMPENSATION. 
ALL PARTICIPANTS WILL RECEIVE $2.50 IN ADDITION TO THE MONEY EARNED 
BASED ON THE INCENTIVE PLAN EXPLAINED BELOW. 
 
In this study, we will use an experimental currency called “Lira”.  
 
Please assume you are the General Manager of Sparky City's Water Treatment Plant and you are 
in charge of making changes to the water treatment process to reduce costs for the coming year.  
 
As General Manager, your compensation for the year is a performance bonus, which is 
20% of the total cost savings to the plant. If you choose a water treatment alternative that 
can generate more cost savings to the water plant, you will receive a greater amount of 
bonus.   
  
The Lira you earn as General Manager will be converted into U.S. dollars at a rate of $1 for 
every 20,000 Lira earned and you will receive instructions on how to receive payment on the last 
screen of this study. The amount of money you earn will depend on the decisions that you make, 
so please follow the instructions carefully. 
 
Please proceed to the following screen where you will learn about your role as General Manager 
of Sparky City's Water Treatment Plant and proposed changes to the water treatment for the 
coming year. 
 
 
I have read and understood the information shown above. 
Yes 
No 
 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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[Comprehension Check Question] 
 
Which type of additional research compensation are you eligible to receive? YOU MUST 
ANSWER THIS QUESTION CORRECTLY TO CONTINUE IN THE STUDY. 
 
A fixed salary of 100,000 Lira 
A performance bonus that is 20% of the total cost savings to the plant 
 
 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Case Scenario: 
The City of Sparky gets its water from the Murry River, and the Water Treatment Plant is 
responsible for treating the water with chemicals to make it safe for use and consumption by the 
residents of Sparky. In order to make the water supply safe for human consumption, the City must 
chemically treat the water before it is made available to the public; however, it is never possible 
to make the water 100% safe. There is always some risk of water-borne illnesses from 
microorganisms in the water supply. They may arise because of bacteria in the actual water supply 
or in the infrastructure (pipes, water holding tanks, etc.). Illnesses from microorganisms in the 
water supply generally result in diarrhea-like symptoms and have little impact on healthy 
individuals. A lower quality water supply may seriously affect the very old, very young, or health 
impaired individuals. 
  
The National Water Association sets standards for water quality. The standards currently state that 
a public water supply should have less than 3,200 microorganisms per billion gallons of water. 
Sparky's average number of microorganisms per billion gallons of water over the past three years 
has been 2,197 microorganisms, within the acceptable range. 
  
The City of Sparky Water Treatment Plant is considering whether to make changes to the 
chemicals used to treat the water to reduce operating costs and, as General Manager, you are 
responsible for making this decision. In the past, you have contracted with Potable Water Chemical 
Company to provide the chemicals to treat the water. You have recently asked the Accounting 
Manager to work with Potable Water to come up with a plan to reduce the costs associated with 
the chemicals used to treat the water.  
 
After several meetings and discussions between plant members and the company, Potable Water 
has set forth several different water treatment alternatives. Each water treatment alternative has a 
potential cost savings, as well as an increase in risk to the public associated with the quality of the 
water supplied to the residents. That is, each alternative will incur a different amount of operating 
cost savings to the plant and has a different risk associated with the quality of the water that the 
water plant provides to the residents of Sparky City. The greater the cost savings, the greater the 
risk. Although the National Water Association states that a public water supply should have less 
than 3,200 microorganisms per billion gallons of water, Potable Water Chemical Company has 
warned that anything above 2,300 microorganisms per billion gallons of water may significantly 
affect the very old, very young, or health impaired individuals. This reduced threshold for 
177 
 
microorganisms per billion gallons of water is attributable to the use of the new water treatment 
chemical.  
 
Manipulation 
Controlling 
In the past, Sparky City Council is known to be controlling and rigid with their decisions related 
to cost savings. They strive to maximize cost savings irrespective of the warning from Potable 
Water Chemical Company. They focus on making decisions that are within an acceptable range 
for standards of water quality, and consider only quantifiable metrics in their decision-making 
process.  
 
Flexibility 
In the past, the Sparky City Council is known to be flexible and adaptable with their decisions 
related to cost savings. They strive to maximize cost savings, but also consider warnings from 
Potable Water Chemical Company.  They focus on making decisions that are within an acceptable 
range for standards of water quality, and consider quantifiable metrics and qualitative factors in 
their decision-making process.  
   
On the following screen, you will review the different water treatment alternatives available and 
choose whether to implement a water treatment alternative for the coming year. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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[Treatment 1: Fixed salary] 
As General Manager, you need to make a decision about which water treatment alternative to 
implement. 
   
Below are nine water treatment alternatives that are available.  
 
Recall the water quality standards currently state that a public water supply should have less than 
3,200 microorganisms per billion gallons of water. Over the past three years the City has averaged 
2,197 microorganisms per billion gallons of water.  
 
Potable Water Chemical Company has warned that anything above 2,300 microorganisms per 
billion gallons of water may significantly affect the very old, very young, or health impaired 
individuals. This reduced threshold for microorganisms per billion gallons of water is attributable 
to the use of the new water treatment chemical. 
 
Controlling 
Recall that Sparky City Council is known to be controlling and rigid with their decisions related 
to cost savings. They strive to maximize cost savings irrespective of the warning from Potable 
Water Chemical Company. They focus on making decisions that are within an acceptable range 
for standards of water quality, and consider only quantifiable metrics in their decision-making 
process.  
 
Flexibility 
Recall that Sparky City Council is known to be flexible and adaptable with their decisions related 
to cost savings. They strive to maximize cost savings, but also consider warnings from Potable 
Water Chemical Company.  They focus on making decisions that are within an acceptable range 
for standards of water quality, and consider quantifiable metrics and qualitative factors in their 
decision-making process.  
 
As General Manager, your compensation for the coming year is a fixed salary of 100,000 Lira.  
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Please review these alternatives. 
Alternative Cost savings to the plant 
Microorganisms per 
Billion 
(% Decrease in Water 
Quality) 
Your 
Compensation 
(Salary) 
1 100,000 Lira 2,219 (1.0%) 100,000 Lira 
2 200,000 Lira 2,230 (1.5%) 100,000 Lira 
3 300,000 Lira 2,252 (2.5%) 100,000 Lira 
4 400,000 Lira 2,296 (4.5%) 100,000 Lira 
5 500,000 Lira 2,373 (8.0%) 100,000 Lira 
6 600,000 Lira 2,483 (13.0%) 100,000 Lira 
7 700,000 Lira 2,636 (20.0%) 100,000 Lira 
8 800,000 Lira 2,845 (29.5%) 100,000 Lira 
9 900,000 Lira 3,109 (41.5%) 100,000 Lira 
 
Which water treatment alternative would you like to implement? 
 
(Note that once you make a decision and continue to the next screen, you will not be able to go 
back and change your answer.) 
                    Alternative  9  
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[Treatment 2: Percentage of cost savings] 
 
As General Manager, you need to make a decision about which water treatment alternative to 
implement. 
   
Below are nine water treatment alternatives that are available.  
 
Recall the water quality standards currently state that a public water supply should have less than 
3,200 microorganisms per billion gallons of water. Over the past three years the City has averaged 
2,197 microorganisms per billion gallons of water.  
 
Potable Water Chemical Company has warned that anything above 2,300 microorganisms per 
billion gallons of water may significantly affect the very old, very young, or health impaired 
individuals. This reduced threshold for microorganisms per billion gallons of water is attributable 
to the use of the new water treatment chemical. 
 
Controlling 
Recall that Sparky City Council is known to be controlling and rigid with their decisions related 
to cost savings. They strive to maximize cost savings irrespective of the warning from Potable 
Water Chemical Company. They focus on making decisions that are within an acceptable range 
for standards of water quality, and consider only quantifiable metrics in their decision-making 
process.  
 
Flexibility 
Recall that Sparky City Council is known to be flexible and adaptable with their decisions related 
to cost savings. They strive to maximize cost savings, but also consider warnings from Potable 
Water Chemical Company.  They focus on making decisions that are within an acceptable range 
for standards of water quality, and consider quantifiable metrics and qualitative factors in their 
decision-making process.  
 
As General Manager, your compensation for the year is a performance bonus, which is 20% of the 
total cost savings to the plant. If you choose a water treatment alternative that can generate more 
cost savings to the water plant, you will receive a greater amount of bonus. 
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Please review these alternatives.  
Alternative Cost savings to the plant 
  
Microorganisms per Billion 
(% Decrease in Water 
Quality) 
     
Your Compensation 
(Bonus) 
1 100,000 Lira 2,219 (1.0%) 20,000 Lira 
2 200,000 Lira 2,230 (1.5%) 40,000 Lira 
3 300,000 Lira 2,252 (2.5%) 60,000 Lira 
4 400,000 Lira 2,296 (4.5%) 80,000 Lira 
5 500,000 Lira 2,373 (8.0%) 100,000 Lira 
6 600,000 Lira 2,483 (13.0%) 120,000 Lira 
7 700,000 Lira 2,636 (20.0%) 140,000 Lira 
8 800,000 Lira 2,845 (29.5%) 160,000 Lira 
9 900,000 Lira 3,109 (41.5%) 180,000 Lira 
 
Which water treatment alternative would you like to implement? 
 
(Note that once you make a decision and continue to the next screen, you will not be able to go 
back and change your answer.)                    Alternative 9  
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----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
[Feedback Screen] 
 
Your water treatment decision has now been implemented.  
  
Thus, for the coming year, the Water Treatment Plant will experience a cost savings of [value] 
Lira. 
 
This will result in a decrease in water quality to the residents of Sparky of [value] (percent).  
 
Treatment 1 
As General Manager, your compensation for the year is a fixed salary of 100,000 Lira. Thus, 
your total compensation will be [value] Lira.  
 
Treatment 2 
As General Manager, your compensation for the coming year is a performance bonus, which is 
20% of the total cost savings to the plant. Thus, your total compensation will be [value] Lira.  
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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[Manipulation Check Questions] 
Sparky City Council is known to be controlling and rigid with their decisions related to cost 
saving. 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
       
 
       
Sparky City Council focuses on making decisions that are within an acceptable range for 
standards of water quality, and consider only quantifiable metrics in their decision making 
process. 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
       
 
Sparky City Council is known to be flexible and adaptable with their decision related to cost 
savings. 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
       
 
Sparky City Council focuses on making decisions that are within an acceptable range for 
standards of water quality, and consider quantifiable metrics and qualitative factors in their 
decision-making process. 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree  Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
 
         
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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 [Post Experiment Questions] 
[Decision Question] 
To what extent did you consider the Potable Water Chemical Company warning that anything 
above 2,300 microorganisms per billion gallons of water may significantly affect the very old, 
very young, or health impaired individuals with the use of new chemical? 
Not at all  Very little Slightly Neutral Somewhat Moderately Very much 
       
 
[Moral Mandate] 
How frequently do you drink water supplied by your city/county/municipality? 
Never Rarely Occasionally Sometimes Frequently Usually Every time 
       
  
What is your level of concern with respect to the water quality in your apartment/house? 
I am very 
unconcerned 
I am 
unconcerned 
I am 
somewhat 
unconcerned 
I am neither 
unconcerned 
nor 
concerned 
I am 
somewhat 
concerned 
I am 
concerned 
I am very 
concerned 
       
I view myself to be very healthy. 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
       
I focus on eating only healthy foods. 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
       
I often exercise regularly in a typical week. 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
       
 
The culture of Sparky City Council impacted my water treatment alternative decision 
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Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
       
I focused on the tradeoff between the cost saving and my personal compensation when making 
my water treatment alternative decision.  
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
       
 
Please provide explanations to the City Council on your reason for choosing your water 
treatment alternative 
 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
To what extent are you familiar with current water treatment issues in this country? 
I am very 
unfamiliar 
I am 
unfamiliar 
I am 
somewhat 
unfamiliar 
I am neither 
unfamiliar 
nor familiar 
I am 
somewhat 
familiar 
I am 
familiar 
I am very 
familiar 
       
 
 
If you are familiar with current water treatment issues, please write the name of the City and 
State below where issues exist. 
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
[Demographic Questions] 
 
Please answer the following questions about yourself. 
What is your gender? 
Male 
Female 
 
What is your country of origin? 
Canada 
China 
India 
US 
Others  
 
What is the highest level of education that you have completed? 
Less than high school 
High school or equivalent 
Associates degree 
Bachelor’s degree 
Master’s degree 
Doctorate degree 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Do you have work experience in the public sector (i.e., governmental organization, hospital, 
university, public educational institution, etc.)? 
Yes 
No 
 
How many years of overall work experience do you have? 
 
 
How many years have you worked in the public sector, if applicable?  
 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
What is your current job title? 
 
 
 
How many years have you been at your current job? 
 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
What is you annual household income? 
Less than $20,000 
$20,000 - $40,000 
$41,000 - $70,000 
$71,000 - $100,000 
Greater than $100,000 
Prefer not to answer 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Do you consider your political views to be: (Select only one) 
More Liberal 
More Conservative 
 
What ethnic group do you consider yourself? (Check only one) 
African 
African/American 
Asian 
Caucasian/White (non-Hispanic) 
Hispanic 
Middle Eastern/Arabic 
Multi-Racial 
Native American 
Other/ Please specify  
Prefer not to answer 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 [Conclusion] 
You have completed this study. We appreciate your time and thank you for your participation!  
  
Please proceed to the next screen to exit this study and receive your validation code for payment. 
 
In order to receive payment, please copy the 4 digit validation code on the next screen for your 
record. Thank you. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
0000 
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APPENDIX J: IRB APPROVALS  
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